Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PlamenTSV/plamen --skill account-validationgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PlamenTSV/plamenWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/account-validation)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/account-validation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/plamentsv/plamen/account-validation/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/account-validation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/plamentsv/plamen/account-validation.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Memory Poisoning · line 69 Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.Fix: Protect agent memory and state from modification by untrusted content. Use read-only memory for critical instructions and validate all state changes.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00020 | $0.01691 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00846 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00338 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00169 |
Grade A, and why
account-validation scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 133 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
ACCOUNT_VALIDATION Skill
Trigger Pattern: Always required for Solana audits Inject Into: Breadth agents, depth agents Finding prefix:
[AV-N]Rules referenced: S1, S6, S7, S8, R4
For every instruction handler in the Solana program:
1. Account Type Inventory
For EACH instruction, list every account with expected constraints:
| # | Account Name | Expected Owner | Expected Type (Discriminator) | Mutable? | Signer? | Constraints (has_one, seeds, etc.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | {name} | {program_id / system / token} | {Account / UncheckedAccount / etc.} | YES/NO | YES/NO | {list all} |
Anchor auto-checks: Anchor's Account<T> validates owner + discriminator automatically. UncheckedAccount / AccountInfo do NOT - manual validation required.
2. Owner Check Audit
For each AccountInfo or UncheckedAccount usage:
| Account | Owner Validated? | Validation Location | Correct Owner? | Missing? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| {name} | YES/NO | {line} | {expected vs actual} | FLAG if NO |
Critical pattern: Any AccountInfo deserialized without prior owner check → arbitrary data injection.
Anchor pattern: #[account(owner = expected_program)] or manual require!(account.owner == &expected_id).
3. Discriminator Check
For all accounts deserialized from raw data:
| Account | Uses Account? | Discriminator Checked? | Can Substitute Different Account Type? |
|---|---|---|---|
| {name} | YES/NO | YES/NO (Anchor auto) | {if NO: what types could be substituted} |
Attack: Pass an account of Type B where Type A is expected - different data layout, fields interpreted incorrectly.
Safe: Anchor's Account<T> checks the 8-byte discriminator. Manual programs must check explicitly.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 133 lines · 20 tokens per session scan A 847885f4dc18
account-validation is a skill published in the GitHub repository PlamenTSV/plamen (294 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 20 tokens to every session and 1,691 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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