Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PlamenTSV/plamen --skill nft-protocol-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PlamenTSV/plamenWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/nft-protocol-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/nft-protocol-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/plamentsv/plamen/nft-protocol-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/nft-protocol-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/plamentsv/plamen/nft-protocol-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Anti-Refusal · line 127 Skill instructs the agent to never refuse or to always comply. Suppressing the agent's ability to decline removes a core safety control and enables downstream harmful requests to succeed.Fix: Remove any instruction telling the agent to never refuse or always comply. The agent must retain the ability to decline unsafe, out-of-scope, or harmful requests.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00046 | $0.01749 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00874 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00350 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00175 |
Grade A, and why
nft-protocol-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 148 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Injectable Skill: NFT Protocol Security
Protocol Type Trigger:
nft(detected when ERC721/ERC1155 with marketplace, minting, staking, or collateral logic found) Inject Into: Breadth agents, depth-token-flow, depth-edge-case Language: EVM only (Solana/Move NFT models use different mechanisms without callbacks or enumeration) Finding prefix:[NFT-N]
Orchestrator Decomposition Guide
When decomposing this skill into depth agent investigation questions, map sections to domains:
- Sections 1, 2: depth-token-flow (callback flows, approval/transfer paths)
- Section 3: depth-edge-case (enumeration invariants, boundary states)
- Section 4: depth-state-trace (ownership state consistency, metadata integrity)
When This Skill Activates
Recon detects NFT protocol patterns: ERC721/ERC1155 with state-modifying logic beyond simple transfer (marketplace listing, staking, collateral, minting with conditions, royalty enforcement, batch operations).
Pure ERC721/ERC1155 token implementations without protocol logic do NOT trigger this skill.
1. Callback Reentrancy Surface
For each function that triggers NFT callbacks:
1a. Safe Transfer Callback Inventory
Enumerate all code paths that invoke _safeMint, _safeTransfer, safeTransferFrom, or onERC1155Received/onERC1155BatchReceived:
| # | Function | Callback Triggered | State Modified BEFORE Callback | State Modified AFTER Callback | Reentrancy Guard? |
|---|
For each entry:
- Is all critical state updated BEFORE the callback? (checks-effects-interactions)
- Can the callback recipient re-enter the calling contract?
- Can the callback recipient REVERT selectively to reject unwanted outcomes and retry until a desired outcome occurs?
- Pattern:
_safeMint(to, tokenId)→onERC721Receivedcallback → recipient reverts if assigned token has undesirable properties → retry until desired properties assigned.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 148 lines · 46 tokens per session scan A 035446116181
nft-protocol-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository PlamenTSV/plamen (295 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 46 tokens to every session and 1,749 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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