Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PlamenTSV/plamen --skill reentrancy-analysisgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PlamenTSV/plamenWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/reentrancy-analysis)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/reentrancy-analysis"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/plamentsv/plamen/reentrancy-analysis/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/reentrancy-analysis"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/plamentsv/plamen/reentrancy-analysis.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Anti-Refusal · line 164 Skill instructs the agent to never refuse or to always comply. Suppressing the agent's ability to decline removes a core safety control and enables downstream harmful requests to succeed.Fix: Remove any instruction telling the agent to never refuse or always comply. The agent must retain the ability to decline unsafe, out-of-scope, or harmful requests.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00037 | $0.02871 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00018 | $0.01435 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00574 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00287 |
Grade A, and why
reentrancy-analysis scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 228 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Skill: REENTRANCY_ANALYSIS
Trigger: REENTRANCY flag detected (dynamic dispatch, closures, dispatchable FA, function values) Used by: Breadth agents, depth-state-trace Covers: Cross-module reentrancy via closures, dispatchable FA hook reentrancy, direct/indirect reentrancy, resource lock gaps
Purpose
Audit reentrancy vectors in Aptos Move. Historically, Move's linear type system and static dispatch prevented reentrancy. Post Move 2.2, function values (closures) and dispatchable FungibleAsset hooks introduce dynamic dispatch, creating reentrancy surfaces analogous to EVM callbacks but with different mechanics and mitigations.
Background: Aptos Reentrancy Model
Pre Move 2.2: No dynamic dispatch. All function calls are statically resolved at compile time. Reentrancy was architecturally impossible (no callbacks, no external calls to untrusted code).
Post Move 2.2: Two reentrancy vectors exist:
- Function values / closures:
|arg| { body }syntax allows passing executable code as parameters. A module calling a user-supplied closure can be reentered. - Dispatchable FungibleAsset hooks:
withdraw,deposit, andderived_balancehooks execute external module code during FA operations. This is framework-level dynamic dispatch.
#[module_lock]: Prevents INDIRECT reentrancy (cross-module reentry into the locked module). Does NOT prevent DIRECT reentrancy (closure calling back into the same module's function within the same execution frame).
Methodology
STEP 1: Dynamic Dispatch Point Inventory
Find ALL uses of dynamic dispatch in the audited modules:
1a. Function Values and Closures
MANDATORY SEARCH: Grep all .move files for:
|followed by parameter patterns (closure syntax:|x| { ... },|x, y| { ... })- Function types in signatures (e.g.,
callback: |u64| -> u64,FunctionValue) move |(move closures that capture variables)- Functions that accept function-typed parameters
| # | Module | Function | Dynamic Dispatch Type | Caller-Controlled? | Reentrancy Risk |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | {module} | {func} | Closure parameter | YES/NO | {assess} |
| 2 | {module} | {func} | Stored function value | YES/NO | {assess} |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 228 lines · 37 tokens per session scan A 142a068bb919
reentrancy-analysis is a skill published in the GitHub repository PlamenTSV/plamen (295 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 2,871 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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