Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PlamenTSV/plamen --skill staking-receipt-tokensgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PlamenTSV/plamenWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/staking-receipt-tokens)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/staking-receipt-tokens"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/plamentsv/plamen/staking-receipt-tokens/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/staking-receipt-tokens"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/plamentsv/plamen/staking-receipt-tokens.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Anti-Refusal · line 72 Skill instructs the agent to never refuse or to always comply. Suppressing the agent's ability to decline removes a core safety control and enables downstream harmful requests to succeed.Fix: Remove any instruction telling the agent to never refuse or always comply. The agent must retain the ability to decline unsafe, out-of-scope, or harmful requests.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00024 | $0.02416 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00012 | $0.01208 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00483 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00242 |
Grade A, and why
staking-receipt-tokens scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 221 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Skill: Staking Receipt Token Analysis
Type: Thought-template (instantiate before use) Research basis: Donation attacks via unsolicited token transfers
Trigger Patterns
delegation|staking.*receipt|liquid.*staking|getLiquidRewards|unbond|
stake.*share|validator|deposit.*voucher|withdraw.*voucher|claimReward
Reasoning Template
Step 1: Identify Receipt Tokens
- In {CONTRACTS}, find all external calls that return tokens
- For each, determine:
- What token type is returned? (shares, vouchers, receipts, LP tokens)
- Is the returned token ERC20-compatible?
- Does the protocol hold these tokens?
Step 2: Check Transferability
- For each receipt token {RECEIPT_TOKEN}:
- Can it be acquired externally? (stake directly with {EXTERNAL_STAKING})
- Can it be transferred via standard
transfer()/transferFrom()? - Can anyone transfer it to {PROTOCOL_CONTRACT} unsolicited?
Step 2b: External Token Transferability
For each EXTERNAL staking/delegation token the protocol interacts with (not just the protocol's own receipt token):
- Is it ERC20-transferable? (check if extends IERC20/IERC20Upgradeable)
- Can it be transferred TO the protocol contract unsolicited (without calling deposit/stake)?
- If YES to both:
a. Does the protocol iterate over these tokens or their sources? (gas DoS from many unsolicited transfers)
b. Does
getTotalStake(protocol)or equivalent change? (accounting impact on withdrawal calculations) c. Doestransfer()trigger side effects? (reward auto-claim, delegation state changes) d. Does non-zero balance block any admin/privileged operations? (e.g., entity removal requires balance == 0)
| External Token | ERC20? | Unsolicited Transfer? | Iteration DoS? | Balance Impact? | Side Effects? | Blocks Operations? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| {token_name} | YES/NO | YES/NO | YES/NO | YES/NO | YES/NO | YES/NO |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 221 lines · 24 tokens per session scan A a22a0071b248
staking-receipt-tokens is a skill published in the GitHub repository PlamenTSV/plamen (295 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 24 tokens to every session and 2,416 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
analyzing-ethereum-smart-contract-vulnerabilities
Perform static and symbolic analysis of Solidity smart contracts using Slither and Mythril to detect reentrancy, integer overflow, access control, and other vulnerability classes before deployment to Ethereum mainnet.
prowler-tour
Keeps product-tour definitions aligned with the UI features they describe. Trigger: When modifying UI components that have associated tours, editing tour definition files, or renaming data-tour-id attributes.
trading-solana
Trade tokens on Solana DEXes - Jupiter, Raydium, Orca, Meteora, Pump.fun.
public
For agents: This document explains how to integrate with Clodds APIs.
pumpfun
Pump.fun - Complete Solana memecoin launchpad. Discovery, trending, gainers, losers, token data all work without a key. Trading requires SOLANAPRIVATEKEY.
dex
Cross-chain DEX market intelligence - trending tokens, gainers, losers, volume, stats across all chains and protocols.