Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/prabhdeepsingh/claude-plugins/securitynpx skills add PrabhdeepSingh/claude-plugins --skill securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PrabhdeepSingh/claude-pluginsWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00102 | $0.02427 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00051 | $0.01213 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00020 | $0.00485 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00243 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 94 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security — decide what can go wrong before deciding what to build
Security added after the design is a patch; security added at build time is a property. The cheapest moment to prevent a vulnerability is while the trust boundaries are still being drawn — before the upload handler exists, before the fetch reaches the network, before the dependency is installed. These rules make that moment explicit: name what can go wrong, gate the changes that widen the attack surface, and treat the classes of failure that recur everywhere — retried secrets, poisoned packages, model output in a sink — as design constraints, not review findings.
When to apply this
Any feature touching authentication or authorization, personal or payment data, file uploads, outbound requests to user-influenced destinations, new dependencies, webhooks or queues, or LLM/agent output feeding anything executable. The scoped mechanics stay with their owners — parameterized queries and boundary validation in [[code-standards]] §9, secret storage and CI credentials in [[infra-standards]] §3/§5 — this skill owns the decisions those mechanics assume were already made.
1. Threat-model first — five minutes, before any control
Before choosing defenses, name what's being defended. Three steps, time-boxed to minutes not meetings:
- Map the trust boundaries — every place outside data enters: HTTP requests, form fields, file uploads, webhooks, third-party API responses, queue messages, and LLM output (it's derived from inputs you don't control, so it's a boundary like any other).
- Name the assets — credentials, PII, payment data, admin capabilities, money movement. A boundary matters in proportion to what's reachable through it.
- Write abuse cases next to use cases. For each feature ask "how would I misuse this?" — then make that abuse the first test you write ([[tdd]]'s bug-fix reflex, applied before the bug exists). "Upload a profile photo" pairs with "upload a 2GB file", "upload an SVG with a script tag", "upload to someone else's profile".
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 94 lines · 102 tokens per session scan A 4a608961731d
security is a skill published in the GitHub repository PrabhdeepSingh/claude-plugins (3 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 102 tokens to every session and 2,427 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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