Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add prime-radiant-inc/greenfield --skill container-executiongit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/prime-radiant-inc/greenfieldWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/prime-radiant-inc/greenfield/container-execution)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/prime-radiant-inc/greenfield/container-execution"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/prime-radiant-inc/greenfield/container-execution.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 4 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 274 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- low Tool Misuse · line 97 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- low Tool Misuse · line 97 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- low Tool Misuse · line 97 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00024 | $0.02226 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00012 | $0.01113 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00445 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00223 |
Grade B, and why
container-execution scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Recursive force deletemediumDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
ca-certificates file strace && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s -D- http://127.0.0.1:3000/ > web/root-response.txt How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 281 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Container Execution
All runtime analysis targets run inside containers. Never execute untrusted code on the host.
Runtime Detection
if command -v docker &>/dev/null; then
RUNTIME="docker"
elif command -v podman &>/dev/null; then
RUNTIME="podman"
else
echo "No container runtime found. Runtime observation unavailable."
# Continue with static analysis modes only
fi
If neither Docker nor Podman is available, skip all agents that require containers. This is not an error — runtime observation is additive.
Container Naming
Container name: greenfield-${WORKSPACE}-target
- Deterministic (same workspace = same name)
- Does not leak the target's identity
- Allows multiple concurrent analyses
Container Lifecycle
digraph container_lifecycle {
rankdir=TB;
"Start container lifecycle" [shape=doublecircle];
"Container runtime available?" [shape=diamond];
"Build target image" [shape=box];
"Build succeeded?" [shape=diamond];
"Start container with resource limits" [shape=box];
"Verify container is running" [shape=box];
"Container running?" [shape=diamond];
"Execute agent commands via docker exec" [shape=box];
"Stop and remove container" [shape=box];
"Lifecycle complete" [shape=doublecircle];
"Skip runtime mode, continue static analysis" [shape=ellipse];
"Log failure, skip runtime mode" [shape=ellipse];
"Start container lifecycle" -> "Container runtime available?";
"Container runtime available?" -> "Build target image" [label="yes"];
"Container runtime available?" -> "Skip runtime mode, continue static analysis" [label="no"];
"Build target image" -> "Build succeeded?";
"Build succeeded?" -> "Start container with resource limits" [label="yes"];
"Build succeeded?" -> "Log failure, skip runtime mode" [label="no"];
"Start container with resource limits" -> "Verify container is running";
"Verify container is running" -> "Container running?";
"Container running?" -> "Execute agent commands via docker exec" [label="yes"];
"Container running?" -> "Log failure, skip runtime mode" [label="no"];
"Execute agent commands via docker exec" -> "Stop and remove container";
"Stop and remove container" -> "Lifecycle complete";
}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 281 lines · 24 tokens per session scan B d6150cec0e22
container-execution is a skill published in the GitHub repository prime-radiant-inc/greenfield (273 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 24 tokens to every session and 2,226 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (recursive force delete, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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Cloudflare Sandboxes SDK for secure code execution in Linux containers at edge. Use for untrusted code, Python/Node.js scripts, AI code interpreters, git operations.
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pwn-aws-ecr
Drive PWN::AWS::ECR from pwneval.
pwn-aws-ecs
Drive PWN::AWS::ECS from pwneval.
symfony:runner-selection
Select and configure the appropriate command runner based on Docker Compose standard, Symfony Docker (FrankenPHP), or host environment.