Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to PsychQuant/che-ical-mcp. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PsychQuant/che-ical-mcp/main/.agents/skills/spectra-audit/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PsychQuant/che-ical-mcpWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/psychquant/che-ical-mcp/spectra-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/psychquant/che-ical-mcp/spectra-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/psychquant/che-ical-mcp/spectra-audit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/psychquant/che-ical-mcp/spectra-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/psychquant/che-ical-mcp/spectra-audit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 10 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Rogue Agent · line 49 Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.Fix: Prevent the skill from modifying its own code, SKILL.md, or configuration files. Treat skill files as read-only at runtime.
- high Anti-Refusal · line 76 Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.Fix: Remove instructions that suppress warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Let the agent surface safety-relevant caveats to the user.
- high Anti-Refusal · line 177 Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.Fix: Remove instructions that suppress warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Let the agent surface safety-relevant caveats to the user.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 52 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 185 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 62 Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.Fix: Set explicit rate limits, timeouts, and resource quotas for API calls, file operations, and compute. Implement circuit breakers for runaway loops.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 155 Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.Fix: Set explicit rate limits, timeouts, and resource quotas for API calls, file operations, and compute. Implement circuit breakers for runaway loops.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 161 Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.Fix: Set explicit rate limits, timeouts, and resource quotas for API calls, file operations, and compute. Implement circuit breakers for runaway loops.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 157 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 196 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00022 | $0.02027 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00011 | $0.01014 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00405 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00203 |
Grade A, and why
spectra-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- spectra-audit — 100% identical, 8 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 235 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Audit changed code for security sharp edges — API design traps, dangerous defaults, and interfaces that make it easy to do the wrong thing.
Good APIs don't require developers to "be careful" to stay secure. If the correct usage requires reading docs, remembering rules, or understanding cryptography, the API has failed.
Core principle: Security should be the path of least resistance. Insecure usage should be harder than secure usage.
Two Modes
This skill operates in two modes depending on how it's invoked:
- Standalone (
$spectra-audit): Full 3-agent parallel analysis on current git diff. See Standalone Mode. - Discipline (via
$spectra-applywhenaudit: true): Condensed checklist applied during implementation. See Discipline Mode.
Both modes share the same Core Framework.
Standalone Mode
When invoked directly as $spectra-audit:
Phase 1: Gather Changes
Run git diff HEAD to get the full diff of current modifications.
If there are no changes, report "No changes to audit" and stop.
Phase 2: Parallel 3-Agent Analysis
Launch 3 agents in parallel (one message, 3 tool calls). Each agent receives the full diff and analyzes it through one adversary lens.
Agent 1 — The Scoundrel (壞蛋)
A malicious developer or attacker deliberately manipulating configuration.
Search the diff for:
- Config options that can disable security mechanisms
- Algorithm parameters that accept downgrades (e.g.,
"none","md5") - Values that can be injected to bypass validation
- Dangerous config combinations (e.g.,
auth_required: true+bypass_auth_for_health: true+health_check_path: "/") - String concatenation in security-critical paths (permissions, queries, paths)
Agent 2 — The Lazy Developer (懶惰的開發者)
A developer who copy-pastes examples and skips documentation.
Search the diff for:
- Unsafe defaults:
verify: false,timeout: 0, empty strings as keys - Zero/nil/empty behavior: what does
timeout=0,max_attempts=0,key=""mean? - Error messages that don't guide toward secure usage
- The "first example found" test: is the most obvious usage secure?
- Path of least resistance: does the simplest way to use this API produce secure results?
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 235 lines · 22 tokens per session scan A f9c71db6cc61
spectra-audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository PsychQuant/che-ical-mcp (36 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 22 tokens to every session and 2,027 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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