Getting it into your agent
This one installs as part of its plugin. Adding the marketplace and installing the plugin brings it with everything else the plugin ships.
/plugin marketplace add queelius/claude-anvil/plugin install alex-confidentialWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/queelius/claude-anvil/confidential)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/queelius/claude-anvil/confidential"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/queelius/claude-anvil/confidential/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/queelius/claude-anvil/confidential"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/queelius/claude-anvil/confidential.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00056 | $0.00837 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00022 | $0.00335 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00167 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00084 |
Grade A, and why
confidential scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 58 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Confidentiality Toolkit
Pick the right tool for what needs protecting, apply it, and optionally sign the result.
Tool Selection
| Signal | Tool | Why |
|---|---|---|
Hugo site, markdown under content/, _index.md cascade, .cryptoid.yaml |
cryptoid | Multi-user/group whole-page encryption integrated with the Hugo build |
HTML files, built site output, PDFs/images for web delivery, <pagevault> tags |
pagevault | Section-level or whole-file encryption, self-contained HTML with viewers |
Signing, signature verification, offline archives, .gpg/.sig files |
gpg | Detached signatures, public-key encryption, passphrase archives |
Decision Tree
Is the target Hugo MARKDOWN content (files under content/)?
YES -> cryptoid
NO -> Is this HTML, built site output, or a file meant for browser viewing?
YES -> pagevault
NO -> gpg
Hugo carve-out: cryptoid encrypts markdown only. Hugo assets (PDFs, images in
static/) and built HTML go to pagevault, even on a Hugo site.
Override: if the user names a tool explicitly, use it.
Compound Workflows
- Encrypt and sign: lock with pagevault (or build the cryptoid-encrypted site), then
gpg --detach-signthe output. - Verify then decrypt: verify the signature against the expected signer's fingerprint (not just "Good signature"), then
pagevault unlock. Recipe ingpg.md. - Web delivery plus archive:
pagevault lockfor browser access,gpg -ethe original for offline backup.
Safety Rules (apply to every tool)
- Secrets never on argv. Do not pass passwords with
-p,--passphrase, orecho "pw" |: argv is visible inpsand literals land in shell history. Use the tool's prompt, its config file (.pagevault.yaml,.cryptoid.yaml), thePAGEVAULT_PASSWORDenvironment variable, or gpg's--passphrase-file/--passphrase-fd 3. - Config files hold cleartext credentials.
.cryptoid.yamland.pagevault.yamlmust be in.gitignore. - Private source repo. cryptoid restores plaintext after each build and pagevault leaves the unlocked originals in place, so the source repo holds plaintext. It must be private, or the plaintext must never be committed.
- Strong passphrases. Ciphertext is published and PBKDF2 (310,000 iterations) is the only brake on offline guessing. Use long random passphrases, not memorable words.
- Deploy the locked files. pagevault never overwrites its input: HTML goes to
_locked/(or-d DIR), other files to a sibling.html(or-o FILE). cryptoid encryptscontent/in place untilcryptoid decrypt. Confirm the deployed files are the locked ones.
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago Changed · -95 lines · +7 tokens per session 2f5515236cfe
- 5d ago Changed 04465a68814b
- 1mo ago First seen · 153 lines · 49 tokens per session scan A dfacf7a818e3
confidential is a skill published in the GitHub repository queelius/claude-anvil (2 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 56 tokens to every session and 837 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other skills, from other repositories
alive:demo
Generate a believable, lived-in ALIVE world from a free-text persona description (custom path) or a deterministic sandbox preset. Routes the create/list/activate/deactivate/delete/status surface and orchestrates the 5-stage subagent generation pipeline.
karpenter
Design, install, debug, review, plan capacity, audit scaling history, migrate from Cluster Autoscaler, and upgrade Karpenter v1.x on EKS. Covers NodePool, EC2NodeClass, NodeClaim, Spot diversity, disruption strategy, Pod Identity/IRSA, interruption queue, private clusters, AMI rotation, and GitOps integration. Use…
azure
Azure identity (Workload Identity, OIDC, Entra ID), resource tagging, AKS platform patterns, RBAC scoping, and production-readiness review — with Terraform generation.
pr-review
Comprehensive PR review across six dimensions — cost impact, environment drift, ownership gaps, SOC 2 compliance, deprecated API / version hygiene, and rollback feasibility. Each mode inspects the diff and current file state, reports findings with severity, and recommends concrete fixes. Use when preparing a PR for…
kubescape
Check Kubernetes manifests, Helm charts, Kustomize overlays and live clusters against NSA-CISA, MITRE ATT&CK, CIS (EKS, AKS, GKE, vanilla) and SOC2 with the Kubescape CLI. Covers framework choice, score and severity gates, PR gates that fail only on new findings (--baseline), exceptions that actually suppress…
alive:system-upgrade
Upgrade ALIVE to the current version. Handles v1/v2/v3.x source states, multi-surface aware (alive-mcp / Hermes / Codex), retroactive version detection, partial-failure resume, dry-run previews, and rollback inspection.