Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add receptron/mulmoterminal --skill mulmoterminal-keysgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/receptron/mulmoterminalWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/receptron/mulmoterminal/mulmoterminal-keys)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/receptron/mulmoterminal/mulmoterminal-keys"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/receptron/mulmoterminal/mulmoterminal-keys/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/receptron/mulmoterminal/mulmoterminal-keys"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/receptron/mulmoterminal/mulmoterminal-keys.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 4 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Rogue Agent · line 3 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 64 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 196 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 198 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00289 | $0.06002 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00144 | $0.03001 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00058 | $0.01200 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00029 | $0.00600 |
Grade A, and why
mulmoterminal-keys scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 13d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 357 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Keyboard, shortcuts and clipboard
These settings all live in ~/.mulmoterminal/config.json, and each write is a partial
POST /api/config merge — write only the key you are changing, so the user's other settings
survive.
"Partial" means per TOP-LEVEL key, and keymap is replaced WHOLE. The merge is
body[key] !== undefined ? sanitize(body[key]) : current (server/config/app-config.ts), so
posting
{ "keymap": { "send": [ … ] } }
does not add a send to the keymap — it makes that the entire keymap, deleting every action
binding the user had. Nothing warns, and the reply is a success.
So a keymap write always sends the complete keymap: what step 1 read, plus the change. Read it,
merge in memory, post the whole thing. Every keymap example below shows one setting on its own for
readability — none of them is a body to post as-is unless the user genuinely has nothing else bound.
Settings has a Keyboard shortcuts section, but it is read-only — it lists every action and
its current binding, plus a send row: one per configured entry, or a single "Not set" placeholder
when there are none. Point the user at it after writing, as the check.
Open with a proposal, not a question — on the keymap path only
First, check which path you are on. This skill answers two different arrivals, and the flow below belongs to one of them:
| the user said | go to |
|---|---|
| nothing specific, or arrived via Set up shortcuts… | this section |
| "selecting text doesn't copy" | copyOnSelect |
| anything about the question pane | questionPaneEnabled |
| "Shift+Enter submits", "Enter makes a newline" | terminalSubmit |
| "Ctrl+C stopped interrupting" | the diagnostic below — not this section, and not terminalSubmit |
"Ctrl+C stopped interrupting" — diagnose, do not propose
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 13d ago First seen · 357 lines · 289 tokens per session scan A 5859a40b895b
mulmoterminal-keys is a skill published in the GitHub repository receptron/mulmoterminal (212 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 289 tokens to every session and 6,002 once invoked, about $0.0014 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
template-engine
Load, validate, and populate templates consistently across frameworks.
checkpoint
Create, list, or recover mid-workflow checkpoints so interrupted work resumes from a known-good position.
update
Update AIWG through its install-aware updater and re-deploy all installed frameworks from the registry.
run
Execute a named script defined in .aiwg/aiwg.config or list all available scripts.
runtime-info
Display a comprehensive runtime environment report covering detected provider, available tools, AIWG version, and installed frameworks.
uninstall-plugin
Remove a previously installed Claude Code marketplace plugin and unregister it from the local plugin registry.