Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skills --skill build-yaml-misconfigurationgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/build-yaml-misconfiguration)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/build-yaml-misconfiguration"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/build-yaml-misconfiguration/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/build-yaml-misconfiguration"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/build-yaml-misconfiguration.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 12 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 41 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Tool Misuse · line 182 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 85 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 87 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 271 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 321 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Tool Misuse · line 356 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 65 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 356 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 356 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 356 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 374 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00065 | $0.04052 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00032 | $0.02026 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00810 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00405 |
Grade A, and why
build-yaml-misconfiguration scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
| `RUN chmod 777` | World-writable files in image | Use specific permissions (`chmod 755`) | Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer my-secret-token" https://api.example.com Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- build-yaml-misconfiguration — 97% identical, 16 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 406 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Build YAML Misconfiguration
Detect and prevent security misconfigurations in GitLab CI and Tekton pipeline definitions. Misconfigured build YAML is a common source of secret leakage, privilege escalation, and supply chain compromise.
GitLab CI (.gitlab-ci.yml)
Secret Exposure
- Never hardcode secrets in
.gitlab-ci.yml,variables:, orscript:blocks. Use CI/CD protected variables or an external vault. - Mask and protect variables: set
masked: trueandprotected: trueon sensitive CI/CD variables. Masked variables are redacted from job logs. - Never echo secrets: avoid
echo $SECRET,printenv,env, orset -xin scripts that handle credentials. Debug output is stored in job logs. - Restrict variable scope: use
protected: trueto limit variables to protected branches/tags only. Use environment scoping to restrict which jobs see which secrets. - Artifacts and caches: never include files containing secrets (
.env, credentials, tokens) inartifacts:orcache:paths. These are stored and downloadable.
# BAD -- secret visible in logs and available on all branches
variables:
DB_PASSWORD: "hunter2"
# GOOD -- use CI/CD protected variable (set in GitLab UI)
# Reference as $DB_PASSWORD in scripts; set masked + protected in settings
Runner and Execution Isolation
- Never use shared runners for secret-heavy jobs without understanding the trust boundary. Prefer project-specific or group runners for sensitive pipelines.
- Never use
privileged: truein runner config unless absolutely required (e.g., container builds). Privileged runners can escape to the host. - Use
dockerorkubernetesexecutor overshellexecutor. Shell executors share the host filesystem and can leak state between jobs. - Tag sensitive jobs to run only on hardened, dedicated runners.
# BAD -- no runner restriction, runs on any available shared runner
deploy-production:
script:
- ./deploy.sh
# GOOD -- pinned to a dedicated runner
deploy-production:
tags:
- production-deploy
- privileged-denied
script:
- ./deploy.sh
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 406 lines · 65 tokens per session scan A 8e361338335d
build-yaml-misconfiguration is a skill published in the GitHub repository RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skills (52 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 65 tokens to every session and 4,052 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (asks for root, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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