Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/containerizationnpx skills add RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skills --skill containerizationgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/containerization)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/containerization"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/containerization.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00033 | $0.00943 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00472 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00189 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00094 |
Grade A, and why
containerization scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 130 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Containerization and OpenShift Integration for MCP Servers
Security Recommendation
MCP servers SHOULD run in containers, leveraging container orchestration platform security features (e.g., OpenShift SCCs) for a hardened-by-default posture.
Container Security Requirements
Run as Non-Root
The container MUST run as a non-root user. OpenShift's default Security Context Constraints (SCCs) enforce this automatically.
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
Drop All Capabilities
Remove all Linux capabilities and add back only what is strictly needed:
securityContext:
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
Read-Only Root Filesystem
Use a read-only root filesystem. Mount a tmpfs only for directories that require temporary writes:
securityContext:
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
volumeMounts:
- name: tmp
mountPath: /tmp
volumes:
- name: tmp
emptyDir:
medium: Memory
Kernel Hardening
| Mechanism | Details |
|---|---|
| SELinux | Enabled by default in OpenShift; confines container processes |
| seccomp | Apply seccomp profiles to restrict available system calls |
securityContext:
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
seLinuxOptions:
type: container_t
Network Policies
Use Kubernetes NetworkPolicies as a pod-level firewall to control all ingress and egress traffic:
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: mcp-server-policy
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: mcp-server
policyTypes: ["Ingress", "Egress"]
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: mcp-client
ports:
- port: 8080
egress:
- to:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: auth-server
ports:
- port: 443
Base Image Selection
- Use a Universal Base Image (UBI) from the official Red Hat Container Registry as the foundation for MCP server containers
- Prefer ubi-minimal to reduce attack surface and installed package count
- Use the most up-to-date image available
- For Red Hat Catalog images, omit floating tags to ensure the latest image is pulled (exception: Konflux uses digest-based pinning with automated updates)
- For non-Red Hat images, pin the version or digest to prevent pulling a tampered image
- Remove non-essential packages and clean caches:
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 130 lines · 33 tokens per session scan A 1731ee938a4d
containerization is a skill published in the GitHub repository RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skills (52 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 33 tokens to every session and 943 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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