Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/cpu-performancenpx skills add RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skills --skill cpu-performancegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/cpu-performance)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/cpu-performance"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/cpu-performance.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00050 | $0.01771 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00025 | $0.00886 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00354 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00177 |
Grade A, and why
cpu-performance scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 153 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
CPU and Performance Configuration
Configure workloads for deterministic CPU performance, correct scheduling policies, and reliable storage and image management.
CPU Isolation
For workloads requiring exclusive CPU access (Guaranteed QoS with dedicated CPUs), all containers in the pod must meet these requirements:
Required for: Telco (mandatory), Far-Edge (mandatory), Extended (mandatory), Non-Telco (optional)
- CPU requests and limits must be identical and specified in whole units (e.g.,
2, not2.5or2000m) runtimeClassNamemust be specified- Annotations must disable CPU and IRQ load-balancing
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: app
annotations:
cpu-load-balancing.crio.io: "disable"
irq-load-balancing.crio.io: "disable"
spec:
template:
spec:
runtimeClassName: performance-rt
containers:
- name: app
resources:
requests:
cpu: "2"
memory: 256Mi
limits:
cpu: "2"
memory: 256Mi
CPU Pool Scheduling Policies
Containers must use the correct scheduling policy for their CPU pool type.
Exclusive CPU Pool
Workloads in the exclusive CPU pool must use real-time (RT) scheduling policy with priority less than 10.
Required for: Far-Edge (mandatory), all others (optional)
Isolated CPU Pool
Workloads in the isolated CPU pool must also use RT scheduling policy.
Required for: Far-Edge (mandatory), all others (optional)
Shared CPU Pool
Workloads in the shared CPU pool must use non-RT scheduling policies (e.g., SCHED_OTHER) to share CPU time fairly with other applications and kernel threads.
Required for: Far-Edge (mandatory), all others (optional)
CPU Pool Consistency
If one container in a pod selects an exclusive CPU pool, all containers in that pod must select the same CPU pool type.
Required for: Far-Edge (mandatory), all others (optional)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 153 lines · 50 tokens per session scan A 42c0af07e1fc
cpu-performance is a skill published in the GitHub repository RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skills (52 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 50 tokens to every session and 1,771 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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