Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skills --skill scc-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/scc-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/scc-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/scc-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/scc-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/scc-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00035 | $0.00780 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00390 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00156 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00078 |
Grade A, and why
scc-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 69 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
OpenShift Security Context Constraints (SCC)
SCCs control what actions pods can perform and what host resources they can access. If no security context is specified, OpenShift applies the restricted SCC by default.
What SCCs Control
- Privileged container execution
- Linux capabilities requested by containers
- Host directory volume mounts
- SELinux context
- Container user and group IDs
- Host namespace and networking access
- FSGroup ownership of volumes
- Supplemental groups
- Read-only root filesystem requirement
- Volume types
- Seccomp profiles
SCC Reference
| SCC | Description | When to Use |
|---|---|---|
| restricted | Denies all host features; requires namespace-allocated UID and SELinux label. Most restrictive. | Default for all workloads; prefer this unless a specific relaxation is justified |
| nonroot | Like restricted, but allows any non-root UID | When the container must run as a specific non-root UID |
| anyuid | Like restricted, but allows any UID/GID | When the container requires a specific UID (including root UID without root privileges) |
| hostnetwork | Allows host networking and ports; requires namespace UID/SELinux | Only for pods that must bind to host network interfaces |
| hostaccess | Allows all host namespaces; requires namespace UID/SELinux | Only for trusted pods requiring host namespace access |
| hostmount-anyuid | Like restricted, but allows host mounts and any UID | Only for pods requiring host filesystem access (e.g., persistent volume recycler) |
| privileged | Full access to all host features; any user, group, SELinux context | Only for cluster administration requiring maximum access |
| node-exporter | Purpose-built for the Prometheus node exporter | Only for the node exporter DaemonSet |
| custom | Administrator-defined constraints | Requires careful security review; document every relaxation |
Security Review Guidelines
- Start from restricted and relax only when a specific capability is justified
- Document why a workload cannot run under restricted
- Custom SCCs require particular scrutiny: every relaxation from restricted must have a documented rationale
- Review that SCCs are bound to the correct ServiceAccounts, not overly broad groups
- Verify that no workload uses privileged SCC unless it is a cluster administration component
- Check that
runAsNonRoot: trueis set unless the container requires root to function - Check that
readOnlyRootFilesystem: trueis set unless the container must write to its root filesystem
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 69 lines · 35 tokens per session scan A 13bde48c8703
scc-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skills (52 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 35 tokens to every session and 780 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
deploy-docker-compose
Run the Omnigent server as a Docker compose stack (server + Postgres) on any Docker host — your laptop, a VPS, EC2 by hand, or as the base layer of any container-platform deploy. Invoke when the user wants to build the image, bring up the compose stack, debug the stack on a host they already have, or extend the stack…
compute-env-setup
Set up a reproducible Feynman compute environment for research jobs. Use when a task needs Python/R packages, GPU libraries, containers, Modal, SSH, caches, or managed model runtime setup.
securing-kubernetes-on-cloud
This skill covers hardening managed Kubernetes clusters on EKS, AKS, and GKE by implementing Pod Security Standards, network policies, workload identity, RBAC scoping, image admission controls, and runtime security monitoring. It addresses cloud-specific security features including IRSA for EKS, Workload Identity for…
detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods
Detect and prevent privilege escalation in Kubernetes pods by monitoring security contexts, capabilities, and syscall patterns with Falco and OPA policies.
implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes
Harden Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control by implementing least-privilege policies, auditing role bindings, eliminating cluster-admin sprawl, and integrating external identity providers.
docker-socket-mount
Docker / containerd socket mounted into a container → host RCE. Common in CI runners, GitOps controllers (ArgoCD, Flux), and 'Docker-in-Docker' setups. Single-command escape via docker run --rm --privileged -v /:/host alpine chroot /host.