Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add rjmurillo/ai-agents --skill threat-modelinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/rjmurillo/ai-agentsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/rjmurillo/ai-agents/threat-modeling)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/rjmurillo/ai-agents/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/rjmurillo/ai-agents/threat-modeling/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/rjmurillo/ai-agents/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/rjmurillo/ai-agents/threat-modeling.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Prompt Injection · line 488 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- low Privilege Escalation · line 170 Skill requests more permissions than appear necessary for its stated functionality. Review if elevated access is justified.Fix: Request only the minimum permissions required. Document why each permission is needed. Remove broad permissions like '*' or 'all'.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00069 | $0.03846 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00028 | $0.01538 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00769 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00385 |
Grade A, and why
threat-modeling scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 493 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Threat Modeling
Systematic identification, documentation, and mitigation of security threats.
Triggers
| Phrase | Context |
|---|---|
threat model |
Starting or updating a threat model |
attack surface analysis |
Identifying exposure points |
security architecture review |
Reviewing design for vulnerabilities |
STRIDE analysis |
Applying STRIDE methodology |
what can go wrong |
Brainstorming security concerns |
Quick Reference
| Input | Output | Destination |
|---|---|---|
| Architecture diagram or description | Threat matrix with STRIDE categories | .project-toolkit/security/threat-models/ |
| Component list | Trust boundary analysis | .project-toolkit/security/threat-models/ |
| Data flow description | Data flow diagram threats | .project-toolkit/security/threat-models/ |
| Prior threat model | Updated model with delta analysis | .project-toolkit/security/threat-models/ |
Process Overview
OWASP Four-Question Framework
=============================
Q1: What are we Q2: What can Q3: What do we Q4: Did we do
working on? go wrong? do about it? a good job?
| | | |
v v v v
+-----------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +----------+
| Phase 1 | | Phase 2 | | Phase 3 | | Phase 4 |
| Scope & | -----> | Threat | -----> | Mitigation| ----> | Validate |
| Decompose | | Identify | | Strategy | | Model |
+-----------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +----------+
| | | |
v v v v
Trust Boundaries STRIDE Matrix Prioritized Threat Model
Data Flows Kill Chains Mitigations Document
Assets Attack Trees Risk Ratings
What ships with it
11 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- references/advanced-analysis.md 1.3 KB
- references/risk-rating-guide.md 4.7 KB
- references/security-defense-in-depth.md 3.0 KB
- references/security-least-privilege.md 4.1 KB
- references/security-owasp-top-10.md 3.8 KB
- references/security-zero-trust.md 3.6 KB
- references/stride-methodology.md 4.9 KB
- scripts/generate_mitigation_roadmap.py 9.6 KB runs code
- scripts/generate_threat_matrix.py 6.4 KB runs code
- scripts/validate_threat_model.py 11 KB runs code
- templates/threat-model-template.md 9.0 KB
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago Changed dd26212a6286
- 9d ago Changed eadafe9cec7b
- 20d ago Changed · +3 lines 13142132fe55
- 22d ago Changed · +6 lines fe385e1364d8
- 24d ago Changed 37da08352111
- 1mo ago Changed · -5 lines e0fe72187609
- 1mo ago First seen · 489 lines · 69 tokens per session scan A a4ed722e2a09
threat-modeling is a skill published in the GitHub repository rjmurillo/ai-agents (48 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 69 tokens to every session and 3,846 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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