mtls-configuration

mtls-configuration is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from rmyndharis/antigravity-skills. It costs 38 tokens per session (2,255 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A guide to mutual TLS, a form of encrypted connection where both services prove their identities with certificates. It focuses on securing communication between internal services in zero-trust networks.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to secure service-to-service traffic, configure certificate rotation, support compliance requirements, or debug mutual TLS connections.
Why use it?
It helps prevent unauthorized services from connecting and provides a way to manage certificates securely. It also helps investigate failed TLS handshakes.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one.

Good fit Use it to secure service-to-service traffic, configure certificate rotation, support compliance requirements, or debug mutual TLS connections.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/rmyndharis/antigravity-skills/mtls-configuration
About the project

Antigravity Skill Vault is a collection of reusable Agent Skills for Google Antigravity, covering software development, operations, security, and business work. It is for people who want Antigravity agents to follow specialized expertise, personas, and structured workflows. The catalogue skills are entries from this collection.

rmyndharis/antigravity-skills · 1,517 stars · on GitHub

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add rmyndharis/antigravity-skills --skill mtls-configuration
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/rmyndharis/antigravity-skills

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for mtls-configuration

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/rmyndharis/antigravity-skills/mtls-configuration/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/rmyndharis/antigravity-skills/mtls-configuration)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/rmyndharis/antigravity-skills/mtls-configuration"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/rmyndharis/antigravity-skills/mtls-configuration/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for mtls-configuration

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/rmyndharis/antigravity-skills/mtls-configuration"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/rmyndharis/antigravity-skills/mtls-configuration.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 38 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 2,255 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

  • high Tool Misuse · line 268
    Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.
    Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
  • medium Excessive Agency · line 351
    Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
    Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00038 $0.02255
Opus 5 $0.00019 $0.01128
Sonnet 5 $0.00008 $0.00451
Haiku 4.5 $0.00004 $0.00226

Measured 6d ago against content hash d0a7feb66f55, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-10, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

mtls-configuration scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

Origin

Copies of this mod

4 near-identical copies found in the catalogue:

skills/mtls-configuration/SKILL.md · 359 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 359 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

mTLS Configuration

Comprehensive guide to implementing mutual TLS for zero-trust service mesh communication.

Do not use this skill when

  • The task is unrelated to mtls configuration
  • You need a different domain or tool outside this scope

Instructions

  • Clarify goals, constraints, and required inputs.
  • Apply relevant best practices and validate outcomes.
  • Provide actionable steps and verification.

Use this skill when

  • Implementing zero-trust networking
  • Securing service-to-service communication
  • Certificate rotation and management
  • Debugging TLS handshake issues
  • Compliance requirements (PCI-DSS, HIPAA)
  • Multi-cluster secure communication

Core Concepts

1. mTLS Flow

┌─────────┐                              ┌─────────┐
│ Service │                              │ Service │
│    A    │                              │    B    │
└────┬────┘                              └────┬────┘
     │                                        │
┌────┴────┐      TLS Handshake          ┌────┴────┐
│  Proxy  │◄───────────────────────────►│  Proxy  │
│(Sidecar)│  1. ClientHello             │(Sidecar)│
│         │  2. ServerHello + Cert      │         │
│         │  3. Client Cert             │         │
│         │  4. Verify Both Certs       │         │
│         │  5. Encrypted Channel       │         │
└─────────┘                              └─────────┘

2. Certificate Hierarchy

Root CA (Self-signed, long-lived)
    │
    ├── Intermediate CA (Cluster-level)
    │       │
    │       ├── Workload Cert (Service A)
    │       └── Workload Cert (Service B)
    │
    └── Intermediate CA (Multi-cluster)
            │
            └── Cross-cluster certs

Templates

Template 1: Istio mTLS (Strict Mode)

# Enable strict mTLS mesh-wide
apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: PeerAuthentication
metadata:
  name: default
  namespace: istio-system
spec:
  mtls:
    mode: STRICT
---
# Namespace-level override (permissive for migration)
apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: PeerAuthentication
metadata:
  name: default
  namespace: legacy-namespace
spec:
  mtls:
    mode: PERMISSIVE
---
# Workload-specific policy
apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: PeerAuthentication
metadata:
  name: payment-service
  namespace: production
spec:
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: payment-service
  mtls:
    mode: STRICT
  portLevelMtls:
    8080:
      mode: STRICT
    9090:
      mode: DISABLE  # Metrics port, no mTLS

Read the full file on GitHub · 359 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 6d ago First seen · 359 lines · 38 tokens per session scan A d0a7feb66f55

Subscribe to this mod's changes

mtls-configuration is a skill published in the GitHub repository rmyndharis/antigravity-skills (1,517 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 38 tokens to every session and 2,255 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.