Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add s0ld13rr/pentestcode --skill adgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/s0ld13rr/pentestcodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/ad)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/ad"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/ad/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/ad"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/ad.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 3 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- medium YARA Match · line 10 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00068 | $0.00646 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00027 | $0.00258 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00129 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00065 |
Grade A, and why
playbook-ad scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Active Directory — Decision Tree
Without credentials
- AS-REP Roasting: accounts with "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" → offline crack (hashcat -m 18200). No creds needed.
- Null session:
enum4linux-ng -A DC→ user list for spray. - Password spraying: one password, many users. Lockout-safe: 1 attempt per 30+ min. Try
Season2024!,Company1!. - NTLM relay: only if SMB signing disabled.
With any valid user
- Kerberoasting: any domain user can request TGS for SPN accounts → offline crack (hashcat -m 13100). Service accounts often have weak passwords.
- BloodHound:
bloodhound-python -u USER -p PASS -d DOMAIN -c all→ shortest path to DA. - GPP passwords:
netexec smb DC -u USER -p PASS --gpp-passwords— legacy, still found.
Delegation abuse
- Unconstrained: machine impersonates ANY user to ANY service. Coerce DC auth (PrinterBug/PetitPotam) → capture TGT → DCSync.
- Constrained: impersonate users to SPECIFIC services via S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy.
- RBCD: if you can write
msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity→ impersonate admin. Discover:impacket-findDelegation DOMAIN/USER:PASS -dc-ip DC
ADCS — check IMMEDIATELY if present
ESC1–ESC8, many give instant DA:
- ESC1: enrollable template with SAN override → request cert as DA
- ESC4: template owner → modify template → create ESC1
- ESC8: HTTP enrollment → NTLM relay to ADCS web endpoint
Tool:
certipy find -u USER@DOMAIN -p PASS -dc-ip DC -vulnerable
Four classic paths to DA
- AS-REP → crack → Kerberoast → crack SPN → ACL path → DA
- Spray → creds → BloodHound → ACL abuse (GenericAll/WriteDACL) → DA
- Null session → user list → spray → delegation abuse → DA
- NTLM relay → local admin → cred dump → lateral → DCSync
DCSync (endgame)
Requires "Replicating Directory Changes" rights:
impacket-secretsdump DOMAIN/USER:PASS@DC → all domain hashes + krbtgt.
With krbtgt hash → Golden Ticket → persistent DA.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · -57 lines · -20 tokens per session 76672dc31206
- 1mo ago First seen · 99 lines · 88 tokens per session scan A 23b599eaf4cb
playbook-ad is a skill published in the GitHub repository s0ld13rr/pentestcode (851 stars, last pushed 15d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 68 tokens to every session and 646 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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