Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add s0ld13rr/pentestcode --skill auth-bypass-idorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/s0ld13rr/pentestcodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/auth-bypass-idor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/auth-bypass-idor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/auth-bypass-idor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/auth-bypass-idor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/auth-bypass-idor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 32 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00097 | $0.00703 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00039 | $0.00281 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00141 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00070 |
Grade A, and why
web-auth-bypass-idor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 45 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Broken Access Control (IDOR / privesc / JWT / mass-assignment)
When this fires
Any app with per-object endpoints, user roles, tokens, or admin functions — the most common (and highest-scoring) web bug class.
Decide — which sub-class
- Object ID in URL/param/body → IDOR (swap it).
- JWT / signed token → JWT abuse.
- Object accepts fields you shouldn't set (
role,isAdmin,is_verified) → mass assignment. - Admin path returns 403 to you → forced browsing / vertical privesc.
Detect → Exploit → PROVE IMPACT
IDOR: authenticate as user A; hit A's /api/orders/1001 → change to 1002/other IDs (incl. UUIDs seen elsewhere,
decremented, from another account). Also flip method (GET→PUT/DELETE) and try without auth.
PROVE: read/modify ANOTHER user's data.
Mass assignment: add {"role":"admin","isAdmin":true,"userId":<victim>} to a profile/update/signup body.
PROVE: your account gains a privilege the UI never grants.
Forced browsing / method: request admin endpoints directly; try X-Original-URL / X-Rewrite-URL / trailing
/./ /%2e/ ; verb tampering (HEAD/OPTIONS); 403-bypass headers (X-Forwarded-For 127.0.0.1).
PROVE: reach an admin function as a low-priv/anon user.
JWT (drive with jwt_analyze, then forge):
alg:none → header {"alg":"none"}, drop signature, set {"admin":true}/{"role":"admin"}
weak HMAC → crack the secret (hashcat -m 16500 <jwt> wordlist) → re-sign with the new claims
alg confusion → RS256→HS256 signing the token with the PUBLIC key as the HMAC secret
kid / jku / x5u → path-traversal/SSRF the key source to one you control
Proof required: access to another user's data, or a forged/tampered token that authenticates you as admin and reaches a privileged action.
Tooling
jwt_analyze for token analysis; Burp/ffuf to sweep object IDs; nuclei -tags idor,jwt,exposure.
False positives / pitfalls
- Server re-checks ownership after the swap (returns 403/empty) → not IDOR; try other IDs/methods.
- Random UUIDs with no leak → IDOR may need an ID-disclosure primitive first.
- "alg:none" rejected by a patched lib → move to weak-secret / confusion / kid.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 45 lines · 97 tokens per session scan A 1018414d5794
web-auth-bypass-idor is a skill published in the GitHub repository s0ld13rr/pentestcode (883 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 97 tokens to every session and 703 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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