Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add s0ld13rr/pentestcode --skill cloudgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/s0ld13rr/pentestcodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/cloud)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/cloud"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/cloud/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/cloud"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/cloud.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 6 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 3 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 9 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 12 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 13 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 16 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 15 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00057 | $0.00618 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00023 | $0.00247 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00124 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00062 |
Grade C, and why
playbook-cloud scanned grade C with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointhighServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
description: Cloud IAM privesc paths and metadata endpoints per provider. Load when the target is cloud or you obtain cloud creds/metadata. Triggers - AWS/GCP/Azure, IAM, S3/blob, 169.254.169.254, access key. Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
**AWS IMDSv1** (no header): `curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/` How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 46 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cloud — Privesc Paths & Metadata
Metadata endpoints (different per cloud!)
AWS IMDSv1 (no header): curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
AWS IMDSv2 (requires token):
TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token)
curl -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN" http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
GCP (requires header): curl -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token
Azure (requires header): curl -H "Metadata: true" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/"
IMDSv1 vs v2 matters: v1 = any SSRF gives cloud creds. v2 requires PUT first (harder via SSRF).
AWS IAM privesc — dangerous permission combos
iam:CreatePolicyVersion→ attach admin policy to selfiam:AttachUserPolicy→ attach AdministratorAccesslambda:CreateFunction+iam:PassRole→ execute as privileged rolests:AssumeRole→ pivot to cross-account rolesec2:RunInstances+iam:PassRole→ launch instance with admin role Tools:pacu(automated),pmapper(permission graph)
GCP privesc
- Default compute SA often has
editor(overprivileged) iam.serviceAccountKeys.create→ generate key for any SAcloudfunctions.functions.create+iam.serviceAccounts.actAs→ RCE as SA- Check for
allUsers/allAuthenticatedUsersbindings (public access)
Azure privesc
- Managed Identity with broad role assignments
Contributor→ deploy resources, potentially read Key Vault- App Registration with high API permissions + admin consent
- Automation account runbooks → execute as automation identity
What to check everywhere
- Public storage (S3/GCS/Blob) —
--no-sign-request/ anonymous - Secrets in repos / CI variables / build logs
- User-data scripts (bootstrap credentials)
- MFA not enforced on admin accounts
- Audit logging disabled or misconfigured
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · -62 lines · -27 tokens per session scan B → C 4f9f3113e2ba
- 1mo ago First seen · 108 lines · 84 tokens per session scan B 3598f458ca7e
playbook-cloud is a skill published in the GitHub repository s0ld13rr/pentestcode (851 stars, last pushed 15d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 57 tokens to every session and 618 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it C with 2 findings (cloud metadata endpoint, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
deploy-fullstack-vercel
Build and deploy a full-stack app (React frontend + Python/FastAPI backend) or a Vellum app to Vercel as a serverless demo with seeded data.
vercel-token-setup
Set up a Vercel API token for publishing apps using browser automation.
cloud-iam-deep
Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2…
sandbox-aws
Sign AWS requests (S3 and every other SigV4 service) in a Code node or CodeAct action, with NodeTool's signer running on the host.
public-ingress
Set up and manage ngrok-based public ingress for local assistants; do not use this in managed mode when platform callback routing is available.
lictor-security-check
Pre-release security audit for ANY project — AI-built or hand-written, web or mobile. Scans the codebase for the full range of real-world risks that get apps breached: leaked API & AI-provider keys, exposed configs/secrets, broken auth & access control (IDOR), injection (SQL/XSS/command), SSRF, open databases & cloud…