Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add s0ld13rr/pentestcode --skill post-exploitgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/s0ld13rr/pentestcodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/post-exploit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/post-exploit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/post-exploit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/post-exploit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/post-exploit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 35 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high YARA Match · line 35 YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00034 | $0.00497 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00199 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00099 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00050 |
Grade A, and why
post-exploit-phase scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Post-Exploitation — What You'll Get Wrong
Credential dump ORDER matters (Windows)
Run ALL three, in this order — each extracts different secrets:
--sam— local account hashes--lsa— service passwords, cached domain creds, DPAPI system keys--dpapi— browser passwords, vault, cookies, Credential Manager
On Domain Controllers add --ntds for all domain hashes.
Fallback: secretsdump.py DOMAIN/USER:PASS@HOST (SAM+LSA+NTDS in one shot).
DPAPI trap
netexec smb HOST -u USER -p PASS --dpapi with NO subcommands = full dump.
Adding subcommands (cookies, nosystem, wifi) LIMITS output. Always bare --dpapi first.
Host Exhaustion — do NOT skip any host
Before a host is "done", ALL of these must be attempted:
- Privesc check (sudo -l / whoami /priv / SUID / kernel version)
- Credentials dumped (SAM+LSA+DPAPI on Windows, shadow/keys/history/configs on Linux)
- Found creds sprayed across ALL known hosts+services
- Network config enumerated (arp, routes, internal DNS) — may reveal hidden subnets
- Internal services discovered (ss -tlnp / netstat) — ports not visible externally
- Stored creds checked (autologon, cmdkey, env vars, browser profiles)
Linux credential locations you'll miss
/home/*/.bash_history— often contains passwords in commands- App configs:
.env,*.conf,*.cfg,*.ini— DB passwords, API keys - SSH keys:
~/.ssh/(private keys ANDauthorized_keysfor persistence) - Browser profiles:
~/.mozilla/firefox/*/logins.json,~/.config/google-chrome/*/Login Data
SSH agent forwarding hijack
If another user has agent forwarding enabled:
find /tmp -name "agent.*" → SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/agent.XXXX ssh target
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · -90 lines · +1 tokens per session scan C → A 10d428e750e0
- 1mo ago First seen · 130 lines · 33 tokens per session scan C 6fc458921fab
post-exploit-phase is a skill published in the GitHub repository s0ld13rr/pentestcode (851 stars, last pushed 15d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 34 tokens to every session and 497 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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