Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to sageox/ox. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sageox/ox/main/.claude/skills/security-review/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sageox/oxWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/sageox/ox/security-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/sageox/ox/security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/sageox/ox/security-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/sageox/ox/security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/sageox/ox/security-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Excessive Agency · line 75 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00151 | $0.01771 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00060 | $0.00708 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00030 | $0.00354 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00177 |
Grade A, and why
security-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 82 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/security-review — ox AI security pipeline
You are orchestrating a Synthesia-style 6-phase security review over the user's diff against origin/main. The pipeline shape, the dedup-before-validate ordering, and the right-size-models-per-phase principle all come from that post; the ox specifics (threat model, CLI/daemon primitives, hunter perspective frames) are local.
Trigger phrases
/security-review(no args) — review the diff vsorigin/main. Default./security-review --scope=<path-glob>— narrow to a specific path./security-review --hunter=<name>— run only one hunter (debug). Valid names:cli-input,secrets-redaction,daemon-ipc,supply-chain,llm-trust./security-review --cap=<usd>— raise the per-run cost cap (default $8; persisted insecurity/config.yml).
What you do
You are not the pipeline. You are the dispatcher. You shell out to security/scripts/orchestrate.sh and surface its output to the user concisely. The pipeline runs the AI subagents itself; do not try to re-implement them in this skill body.
bash security/scripts/orchestrate.sh "$@"
The orchestrator drives all six phases:
- Prep — compute scope (diff vs origin/main), write
security/.output/scope.md, and build the review input: the diff itself, test files excluded, split into chunks underdiff.chunk_bytes(security/.output/review/). - Map — run
security/scripts/deterministic.sh(parallel OSS scanners; each reportsran/skipped/failed) + one Cartographer call (Haiku) per chunk, reading the diff, to map entry points (CLI commands, daemon IPC handlers) to sinks. Writessecurity/.output/surface.md. - Hunt — per chunk, 5 hunter subagents in parallel (Sonnet), each reading the diff, the surface map and scope. Each has an explicit perspective frame (
cli-input/secrets-redaction/daemon-ipc/supply-chain/llm-trust) to fight finding convergence. Writessecurity/.output/findings-raw.jsonl. - Dedup — single Sonnet pass merges hunter findings + deterministic findings by root cause. Writes
security/.output/findings-deduped.jsonl. - Validate — one call per finding, model split: Sonnet for ~90%, Opus for findings in the hard classes (
secrets-redaction,daemon-ipc,supply-chain;security/config.ymlhard_classes). Stricter than hunters; traces real call paths; checks existing mitigations. - Aggregate — apply the coverage gate, drop false-positives, rank by severity, emit
security/.output/FINDINGS.md(markdown) +security/.output/findings.sarif(machine).
What ships with it
18 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- prompts/cartographer.md 6.9 KB
- prompts/dedup.md 5.0 KB
- prompts/hunter-cli-input.md 9.4 KB
- prompts/hunter-daemon-ipc.md 10 KB
- prompts/hunter-injection.md 4.0 KB
- prompts/hunter-ledger-write-redaction.md 3.8 KB
- prompts/hunter-llm-trust.md 10 KB
- prompts/hunter-local-fs.md 3.7 KB
- prompts/hunter-mcp-trust.md 4.4 KB
- prompts/hunter-secrets-crypto.md 4.0 KB
- prompts/hunter-secrets-redaction.md 9.5 KB
- prompts/hunter-supply-chain.md 9.4 KB
- prompts/hunter-token-handling.md 3.9 KB
- prompts/validator.md 6.5 KB
- schemas/cartographer.json 1.3 KB
- schemas/dedup.json 676 B
- schemas/hunter.json 615 B
- schemas/validator.json 509 B
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago Changed 8bb0f6f64d64
- 18d ago Changed ba4a12e40c37
- 19d ago Changed · +5 lines 9ba124f6c151
- 1mo ago First seen · 77 lines · 151 tokens per session scan A edd33acf24ba
security-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository sageox/ox (65 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 151 tokens to every session and 1,771 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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Use when completing tasks, implementing major features, or before merging to verify work meets requirements.
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