b2c-scapi-shopper

b2c-scapi-shopper is a skill for Claude Code from SalesforceCommerceCloud/b2c-developer-tooling. It costs 118 tokens per session (772 once invoked), scanned A, original, Apache-2.0.

Guidance for calling Salesforce B2C Commerce Shopper APIs from a headless storefront—a website whose front end is separate from the commerce system. It covers customer-facing tasks such as products, baskets, orders, customer data, and shopper context.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it with PWA Kit, Storefront Next, or another headless commerce app when searching products, managing baskets, placing orders, handling customers, or setting shopper context.
Why use it?
It provides patterns for connecting a custom storefront to standard commerce services without guessing how the API interactions should work.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: shipped in a Claude Code plugin.

Part of the b2c plugin — 20 skills shipped together

Good fit Use it with PWA Kit, Storefront Next, or another headless commerce app when searching products, managing baskets, placing orders, handling customers, or setting shopper context.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/salesforcecommercecloud/b2c-developer-tooling/b2c-scapi-shopper
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add SalesforceCommerceCloud/b2c-developer-tooling --skill b2c-scapi-shopper
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SalesforceCommerceCloud/b2c-developer-tooling

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install b2c, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 20 skills.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for b2c-scapi-shopper

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/salesforcecommercecloud/b2c-developer-tooling/b2c-scapi-shopper/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/salesforcecommercecloud/b2c-developer-tooling/b2c-scapi-shopper)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/salesforcecommercecloud/b2c-developer-tooling/b2c-scapi-shopper"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/salesforcecommercecloud/b2c-developer-tooling/b2c-scapi-shopper/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for b2c-scapi-shopper

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/salesforcecommercecloud/b2c-developer-tooling/b2c-scapi-shopper"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/salesforcecommercecloud/b2c-developer-tooling/b2c-scapi-shopper.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 118 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 772 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026
SkillSpector: 16 findings, up to high

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

  • high Memory Poisoning · line 266
    Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.
    Fix: Protect agent memory and state from modification by untrusted content. Use read-only memory for critical instructions and validate all state changes.
  • high Memory Poisoning · line 278
    Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.
    Fix: Protect agent memory and state from modification by untrusted content. Use read-only memory for critical instructions and validate all state changes.
  • medium Agent Snooping · line 73
    Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
    Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
  • medium Agent Snooping · line 361
    Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
    Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
  • medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 80
    Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.
    Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
  • medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 118
    Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.
    Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
  • medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 126
    Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.
    Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
  • medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 140
    Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.
    Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
  • medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 148
    Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.
    Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
  • medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 162
    Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.
    Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
  • medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 175
    Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.
    Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
  • medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 197
    Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.
    Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
  • medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 230
    Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.
    Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
  • medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 244
    Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.
    Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
  • medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 296
    Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.
    Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
  • medium Agent Snooping · line 363
    Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
    Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00118 $0.00772
Opus 5.5 $0.00047 $0.00309
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00024 $0.00154
Haiku 4.5 $0.00012 $0.00077

Measured 21d ago against content hash 16ab740894ab, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

b2c-scapi-shopper scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 21d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

skills/b2c/skills/b2c-scapi-shopper/SKILL.md · 57 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 57 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Shopper Commerce APIs

Build storefront product, basket, checkout, customer, and context flows with SCAPI. For backend management use the b2c-scapi-admin skill.

Tool choice

When B2C MCP is available:

  • Read skill://mcp/b2c-mcp-scapi/SKILL.md once through resources or skills_read before code-mode tools; pass skillRead: true.
  • scapi_search with authType: "shopper" discovers bundled contracts offline. Find method/path/operationId first, then selected inputs, response fields, and security. Mixed Admin/Shopper operations can appear in either filter.
  • Shopper execution is unsupported in scapi_execute; adding a SLAS client cannot enable it. Execute storefront flows through the application's Shopper SDK/client with the appropriate SLAS token flow. Prefer dedicated tools where available.
  • scapi_schemas_list retrieves live tenant contracts and custom attributes; scapi_custom_apis_get_status checks custom registration. Code mode does not execute custom APIs.
  • config_inspect reports configured values with masking. docs_search/docs_read answer platform semantics, authentication, and limits; avoid duplicate contract reads.

CLI alternatives: b2c scapi schemas list, b2c scapi schemas get <family> <name> <version>, and b2c setup inspect. These schema commands use live Schemas API access; MCP discovery is offline.

Integration essentials

  • Reuse configured shortCode, organizationId, and siteId; do not invent identifiers.
  • Shopper authentication uses SLAS guest/registered flows and client scopes; Account Manager credentials are not a substitute. Keep private-client secrets and token exchange on the backend.
  • Discover the contract for the selected API version. Examples are illustrative; verify version-specific behavior and limits in official docs.
  • Preserve basket/order state and handle errors explicitly. Page/filter responses and return only fields needed by the next operation.
  • For headless payment authorization, inspect the order-PI hooks in the b2c-hooks skill ("Headless Order Payment") and the order lifecycle in the b2c-ordering skill before choosing a placement flow.

Read the full file on GitHub · 57 lines

Files

What ships with it

5 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 21d ago Changed 16ab740894ab
  2. 1mo ago Changed · -316 lines 3d7db994dd9c
  3. 1mo ago First seen · 373 lines · 118 tokens per session scan A 94a5f116df0f

Subscribe to this mod's changes

b2c-scapi-shopper is a skill published in the GitHub repository SalesforceCommerceCloud/b2c-developer-tooling (56 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 118 tokens to every session and 772 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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