Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add samihalawa/linkedin-godmode-plugin --skill linkedin-safety-verificationgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/samihalawa/linkedin-godmode-pluginWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/samihalawa/linkedin-godmode-plugin/linkedin-safety-verification)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/samihalawa/linkedin-godmode-plugin/linkedin-safety-verification"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/samihalawa/linkedin-godmode-plugin/linkedin-safety-verification/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/samihalawa/linkedin-godmode-plugin/linkedin-safety-verification"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/samihalawa/linkedin-godmode-plugin/linkedin-safety-verification.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00044 | $0.00424 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00170 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00085 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00042 |
Grade A, and why
linkedin-safety-verification scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Safety and verification
- Establish from the current request and authenticated account context that the user controls the account and requested the operation. Do this once for batch scope. Standing authorization eliminates agent-invented gates but never overrides the selected controller's action-time confirmation policy for sensitive-data entry, uploads, or submission.
- Prefer
LINKEDIN_GODMODE_READ_ONLY=1for inspection. - Keep capture scope narrow; bodies are opt-in.
- Never expose cookies, authorization, API keys, CDP URLs, or task secrets.
- Bulk work is allowed when the user authorizes the cohort, filters, or all matching items. Do not bypass challenges, evade limits, import/export cookies, schedule unrequested recurring campaigns, or add hidden out-of-scope loops.
- Use the user-selected authenticated controller as authoritative. One controller's failure does not prove LinkedIn unavailable, and concurrent controllers must not read or write the same LinkedIn account.
- For each write, execute once, verify it, and continue automatically. If the selected controller mandates action-time confirmation, prepare as far as allowed and ask once at the latest permitted moment with the exact role, destination, data, file, and action. Group only fully defined imminent actions; never ask early, vaguely, or again for an unchanged disclosed action.
- After one literal account-wide quota or restriction state, preserve the queue and use independent authorized routes; recheck the blocked lane only after a reset or state-change signal.
- Verify the failing or changed layer itself: browser state for UI, fresh API read for HTTP, provider status for hosted tasks.
- State exact uncertainty when cloud providers or live LinkedIn behavior were not exercised. Do not infer exclusive causality from missing logs.
Use references/verification-gates.md for preflight and closure checks.
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 20 lines · 44 tokens per session scan A 64eee2a6ae00
linkedin-safety-verification is a skill published in the GitHub repository samihalawa/linkedin-godmode-plugin (0 stars, last pushed 7d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 44 tokens to every session and 424 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
linkedin-safety-verification compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| linkedin-safety-verificationsamihalawa/linkedin-godmode-plugin | Skill | 0 | 7d ago | MIT | A | 44 | Claude Code, Codex |
| job-searchneonwatty/job-apply-plugin | Skill | 135 | 18d ago | MIT | A | 45 | Claude Code |
| job-preferencesneonwatty/job-apply-plugin | Skill | 135 | 18d ago | MIT | A | 28 | Claude Code |
| mk:agent-browserngocsangyem/MeowKit | Skill | 15 | 7d ago | MIT | A | 114 | Claude Code |
| linkedin-outreachmatteolegrottaglie/curtis | Skill | 0 | 2mo ago | MIT | A | 55 | Claude Code, Codex |
| pinchtab-stealth-scorepinchtab/pinchtab | Skill | 11k | 11d ago | MIT | A | 168 | Claude Code, Codex |
| reviewSethGammon/Citadel | Skill | 927 | 2d ago | MIT | A | 17 | Claude Code |