Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Samurai-goose/SPECTER-The-Illusive-Security-Protocol --skill container-and-runtime-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Samurai-goose/SPECTER-The-Illusive-Security-ProtocolWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/samurai-goose/specter-the-illusive-security-protocol/container-and-runtime-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/samurai-goose/specter-the-illusive-security-protocol/container-and-runtime-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/samurai-goose/specter-the-illusive-security-protocol/container-and-runtime-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/samurai-goose/specter-the-illusive-security-protocol/container-and-runtime-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/samurai-goose/specter-the-illusive-security-protocol/container-and-runtime-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00033 | $0.01775 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00888 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00355 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00178 |
Grade B, and why
container-and-runtime-security scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
- Run as root? Check `USER` directive enforcement Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
- Can container reach cloud metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254)? Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- Leftover build tools (gcc, wget, curl, nc) enabling exploitation? How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 183 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Container & Runtime Security
Purpose
Assess container runtime security beyond static configuration. While cloud-config-audit reviews IaC and Kubernetes manifests, this skill focuses on runtime exploitability: container escape paths, kernel vulnerabilities, capability abuse, namespace breakouts, service mesh bypass, and orchestration runtime issues. Validates whether misconfigurations are actually exploitable at runtime.
Triggers
- Containerized workloads in authorized scope
- Cloud-config-audit identifies container misconfigurations needing runtime validation
- User requests container escape or runtime assessment
- Kubernetes cluster authorized for active testing
- Container image needs runtime security evaluation
Required Inputs
| Input | Description | Required |
|---|---|---|
governance_context |
Active engagement governance record | Yes |
target |
Container, pod, cluster, or container image | Yes |
access_level |
Current access (shell in container, K8s API access, etc.) | Yes |
runtime |
Docker, containerd, CRI-O, Podman | Recommended |
orchestrator |
Kubernetes, ECS, Docker Swarm, Nomad | Recommended |
Workflow
-
Scope Verification — Confirm container environment is within authorized scope. Verify blast radius constraints.
-
Container Escape Path Analysis
Path Condition Test Privileged container --privilegedorprivileged: trueMount host filesystem, access host devices Dangerous capabilities SYS_ADMIN,SYS_PTRACE,DAC_READ_SEARCH,NET_ADMINCapability-specific escape techniques Host PID namespace hostPID: trueAccess host processes, /procmanipulationHost network namespace hostNetwork: trueSniff host traffic, access host-bound services Host IPC namespace hostIPC: trueShared memory access, IPC exploitation Docker socket mount /var/run/docker.sockmountedFull host control via Docker API Host path mounts Sensitive host paths mounted (/, /etc, /var) Read/write host filesystem Kernel exploits Unpatched kernel, known CVEs Privilege escalation to host cgroup escape Writable cgroup filesystem (CVE-2022-0492 pattern) Escape via release_agent runc vulnerabilities Outdated runc version CVE-2019-5736 (runc overwrite) pattern eBPF abuse SYS_ADMINorBPFcapabilityKernel-level visibility and manipulation
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 183 lines · 33 tokens per session scan B a36c5495630b
container-and-runtime-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository Samurai-goose/SPECTER-The-Illusive-Security-Protocol (2 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 33 tokens to every session and 1,775 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (asks for root, cloud metadata endpoint, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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