Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add sawrus/agent-guides --skill pipeline-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sawrus/agent-guidesWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/sawrus/agent-guides/pipeline-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/sawrus/agent-guides/pipeline-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/sawrus/agent-guides/pipeline-security.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 88 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00027 | $0.00699 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00349 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00140 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00070 |
Grade A, and why
pipeline-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 97 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Skill: Pipeline Security
Expertise: OIDC cloud auth, least-privilege workflow permissions, secret scanning, keyless artifact signing, SLSA provenance, and admission policy checks.
When to load
When designing or hardening CI/CD pipelines for production deployments, especially where compliance or high-risk workloads are involved.
Security Outcomes (definition of done)
- Pipeline uses OIDC federation (no long-lived cloud keys in CI secrets).
- Artifacts are signed keylessly and verified with identity constraints.
- Provenance + SBOM are generated and validated before deploy.
- Workflows use minimal GitHub/GitLab permissions.
- Runtime admission policies block unsigned/unattested artifacts.
OIDC Authentication (no long-lived credentials)
jobs:
deploy:
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
steps:
- uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@<pinned-sha>
with:
role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/github-actions-deploy
aws-region: us-east-1
- Constrain trust policy by repo, ref, and workflow identity.
- Prefer short session duration and environment-scoped roles.
Minimal Permissions Model
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write
packages: write
- Deny by default; explicitly request only required scopes.
- Split build and deploy into separate jobs with separate permissions.
Keyless Signing + Verification
# Sign immutable artifact digest
cosign sign --yes registry.example.com/team/service@sha256:<digest>
# Verify identity and issuer in deploy gate
cosign verify \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
--certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/myorg/myrepo/\.github/workflows/.+@refs/tags/v.+' \
registry.example.com/team/service@sha256:<digest>
Provenance + SBOM Requirements
- Generate SLSA provenance attestation for each release artifact.
- Generate CycloneDX/SPDX SBOM for exact artifact digest.
- Store attestation/SBOM references in release metadata.
- Block deploy if attestation/SBOM is missing or invalid.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 97 lines · 27 tokens per session scan A 85882bba9404
pipeline-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository sawrus/agent-guides (17 stars, last pushed 8d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 27 tokens to every session and 699 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
ci-cd-and-automation
Automates CI/CD pipeline setup. Use when setting up or modifying build and deployment pipelines. Use when you need to automate quality gates, configure test runners in CI, or establish deployment strategies.
agentic-actions-auditor
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dep
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tdd-configure-ci
Configures CI/CD pipelines to mechanically enforce CONSTRAINTS.md quality bars and Floor-Guard anti-cheat rules. (Optional Utility).
nx-ci-monitor
Monitor Nx Cloud CI pipeline status and handle self-healing fixes automatically. Use when user says "watch CI", "monitor pipeline", "check CI status", "fix CI failures", or "self-heal CI". Requires Nx Cloud connection. Do NOT use for local task execution (use nx-run-tasks) or general CI debugging outside Nx Cloud.
perf-lighthouse
Run Lighthouse audits locally via CLI or Node API, parse and interpret reports, and set performance budgets. Use when measuring site performance, understanding Lighthouse scores, setting up budgets, or integrating audits into CI. Triggers on: lighthouse, run lighthouse, lighthouse score, performance audit, performance…