Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add sbom-tool/gh-guard --skill trusted-publishinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sbom-tool/gh-guardWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/sbom-tool/gh-guard/trusted-publishing)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/sbom-tool/gh-guard/trusted-publishing"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/sbom-tool/gh-guard/trusted-publishing.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00018 | $0.01280 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00640 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00256 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00128 |
Grade A, and why
trusted-publishing scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 141 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Trusted Publishing for crates.io
Trusted Publishing uses OIDC (OpenID Connect) to authenticate GitHub Actions workflows to crates.io without long-lived API tokens. This eliminates the risk of token theft and credential leaks.
Threat Model
| Attack Vector | API Token | Trusted Publishing |
|---|---|---|
| Token leaked in logs | Vulnerable | N/A (no token) |
| Token stolen from secrets | Vulnerable | N/A (no token) |
| Compromised maintainer account | Token can be exfiltrated | OIDC scoped to repo + workflow |
| Supply chain attack on CI | Token available in env | Token scoped to specific environment |
| Token rotation burden | Manual rotation needed | Automatic, ephemeral tokens |
Prerequisites
- Crate already published — You must have done at least one
cargo publishwith a traditional token. Trusted Publishing cannot be used for the initial publish. - GitHub environment created — Create a
crates-ioenvironment in repo Settings > Environments. - Owner access on crates.io — You must be an owner of the crate to configure publishing settings.
Step-by-Step Setup
Step 1: Create GitHub Environment
- Go to repo Settings > Environments > New environment
- Name it
crates-io(must match theenvironment:in your workflow) - Optionally add protection rules (required reviewers, deployment branches)
- No secrets needed — OIDC provides the token automatically
Step 2: Configure at crates.io
GOTCHA: This is configured at crates.io, not in your repository.
- Go to
https://crates.io/crates/YOUR_CRATE/settings - Under "Trusted Publishing", click "Add"
- Fill in:
- Repository owner: Your GitHub org or username
- Repository name: Your repo name
- Workflow filename:
publish.yml(or whatever you named your publish workflow) - Environment:
crates-io
- Click "Add"
Step 3: Update Your Publish Workflow
The workflow needs two key pieces:
id-token: writepermission on the publish job:
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 141 lines · 18 tokens per session scan A 6ca9d4d48e10
trusted-publishing is a skill published in the GitHub repository sbom-tool/gh-guard (15 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 18 tokens to every session and 1,280 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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