Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add sd0xdev/sd0x-harness --skill push-cigit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sd0xdev/sd0x-harnessWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/sd0xdev/sd0x-harness/push-ci)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/sd0xdev/sd0x-harness/push-ci"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/sd0xdev/sd0x-harness/push-ci/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/sd0xdev/sd0x-harness/push-ci"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/sd0xdev/sd0x-harness/push-ci.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 20 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 3 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 25 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 26 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 60 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 1403 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 95 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 644 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 1329 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Anti-Refusal · line 1417 Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.Fix: Remove instructions that suppress warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Let the agent surface safety-relevant caveats to the user.
- high Tool Misuse · line 1621 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 34 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 73 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 915 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 63 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 231 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 382 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 984 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 73 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 1563 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 1587 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00082 | $0.44137 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00033 | $0.17655 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.08827 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.04414 |
Grade A, and why
push-ci scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 15d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,767 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Push & CI Monitor
Read first: references/authorization-contract.md before any push — § Push safety for the credential and the two prompt classes, § Efficacy Boundary for what an approval here does and does not authorize. If that Read fails, stop and report it; do not push.
Push to remote with user approval, then monitor CI run until completion.
Authorization
⚠️ This skill is one of three *skill* paths authorized to execute `git push`, beside Register #4's
⚠️ `user-authorized execution` — the user's own message naming the push, which no skill can grant,
⚠️ request or infer, and which this block must never be cited to refuse.
⚠️ The second is /epic-merge (--force-with-lease for stacked PR chains, per-iteration AskUserQuestion gate).
⚠️ The third is /gh-stack, which pushes through `gh stack link|push|submit --auto` — a plain `--atomic` push for link, a per-branch `--force-with-lease` for the other two (per-use AskUserQuestion gate). It never pushes a branch directly.
⚠️ This skill may also use --force-with-lease, but only when the caller passes the flag — and NEVER onto a protected branch; bare --force is forbidden everywhere.
⚠️ /deploy-flow never runs git push itself; a declared `run` step under `Run Steps: execute` may push on its own, outside this skill — the project's opted-in, stated risk.
⚠️ All other skills and rules MUST output push commands only (not execute).
⚠️ Push REQUIRES explicit user approval via AskUserQuestion — no exceptions.
| Rule | This Skill | /epic-merge |
/gh-stack |
/deploy-flow |
All Other Skills |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
git push |
Execute (after user approval) | Forbidden (uses --force-with-lease only) |
Never directly — only as what gh stack link runs underneath (--atomic, no force), after a per-use AskUserQuestion naming that form |
Never itself; a run step under Run Steps: execute may push outside this skill (run-script risk) |
Forbidden (output only) |
git push --force |
Forbidden | Forbidden | Forbidden | Forbidden | Forbidden |
git push --force-with-lease |
Execute — only when --force-with-lease is explicitly passed, after user approval naming the force form; never onto a protected branch (Phase 0 hard-aborts, Phase 2 re-asserts) |
Execute (after per-iteration AskUserQuestion) | Execute through the extension (gh stack push / submit --auto, per-branch value-bearing lease), after the unshared attestation and a per-use AskUserQuestion naming the force form; a protected branch may be the stack's base, never a layer |
Forbidden | Forbidden |
| Push to protected branches (main/master/develop/release/*) | Warn + pre-approval via AskUserQuestion (final gate is the terminal hook when installed, otherwise this approval); with --force-with-lease → hard abort, no question asked |
Protected PR heads rejected — Phase 0 validation, re-asserted before Step 5 and Rollback (a PR head is not inherently unprotected) | Refused as a stack layer in Phase 2; the chain's base may be one | Never itself — a declared merge into one is local, and a later push goes through this skill | Forbidden |
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 15d ago Changed · +17 lines 412475b8cdfe
- 22d ago Changed · +3 lines 8ddbab63a875
- 23d ago Changed · +25 lines 1cc977c3170a
- 25d ago Changed · +17 lines 5c8136aeb068
- 1mo ago First seen · 1,705 lines · 82 tokens per session scan A b94ee09d4b94
push-ci is a skill published in the GitHub repository sd0xdev/sd0x-harness (194 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 82 tokens to every session and 44,137 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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