Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add selvarajmurugesan90/ops-engineering-skills --skill cloud-access-request-and-iam-lifecycle-managementgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/selvarajmurugesan90/ops-engineering-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/selvarajmurugesan90/ops-engineering-skills/cloud-access-request-and-iam-lifecycle-management)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/selvarajmurugesan90/ops-engineering-skills/cloud-access-request-and-iam-lifecycle-management"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/selvarajmurugesan90/ops-engineering-skills/cloud-access-request-and-iam-lifecycle-management/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/selvarajmurugesan90/ops-engineering-skills/cloud-access-request-and-iam-lifecycle-management"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/selvarajmurugesan90/ops-engineering-skills/cloud-access-request-and-iam-lifecycle-management.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Excessive Agency · line 33 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 271 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00138 | $0.04020 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00055 | $0.01608 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00028 | $0.00804 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00402 |
Grade A, and why
cloud-access-request-and-iam-lifecycle-management scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 321 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cloud Access Request and IAM Lifecycle Management
Purpose
Most IAM risk doesn't come from a badly designed policy — it comes from the hundreds of small, one-off access grants made under time pressure that never get revoked: a contractor's temporary S3 access still active a year after the contract ended, a new hire given broad access "just to get them started" while the ticket to scope it down never gets filed, an on-call engineer's incident break-fix grant that quietly becomes permanent. This skill covers that everyday operational transaction — receiving a request, granting the narrowest permission that satisfies it, attaching a hard expiry, and leaving an audit trail that a review can reconstruct without asking "who approved this and why" — as a repeatable process, not a design exercise. It assumes the underlying policy/role structure already exists (or is designed per cloud-iam-hardening); this skill is about the individual grant/revoke lifecycle transaction on top of that structure.
When to use
- A contractor, new hire, vendor, or auditor needs a specific, scoped
permission for a defined period (e.g. "read-only access to the
analyticsS3 bucket for 30 days"). - An incident responder needs temporary elevated (break-fix) access to a production resource beyond their standing role, for the duration of the incident only.
- Someone changed teams, finished a contract, or left the company, and their previously granted access needs to be revoked.
- A recurring or one-off access request needs to be logged with who requested it, who approved it, what was granted, and when it expires — because a security review or auditor will ask for exactly that trail.
- An access grant that was supposed to be temporary is still active past its intended expiry and needs to be found and cleaned up.
- Someone asks "why do I still have access to X" or "why was my access request denied/delayed."
Prerequisites & environment
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 321 lines · 138 tokens per session scan A a44c41cb7000
cloud-access-request-and-iam-lifecycle-management is a skill published in the GitHub repository selvarajmurugesan90/ops-engineering-skills (42 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 138 tokens to every session and 4,020 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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