Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to senda-labs/DQIII8. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/senda-labs/DQIII8/main/.claude/skills/red-team/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/senda-labs/DQIII8Wrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/senda-labs/dqiii8/red-team)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/senda-labs/dqiii8/red-team"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/senda-labs/dqiii8/red-team/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/senda-labs/dqiii8/red-team"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/senda-labs/dqiii8/red-team.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 4 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 118 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 130 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 145 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 54 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00061 | $0.02695 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.01347 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00539 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00269 |
Grade A, and why
red-team scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
result=$(curl -s --connect-timeout 2 -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://localhost:$port 2>/dev/null) How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 249 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/red-team — Adversarial Security Testing
Attack the codebase like a real hacker. Find vulnerabilities that static scanners miss. Think like an attacker, not a checker.
Usage
/red-team # Full attack on current project
/red-team $ARGUMENTS # Attack specific path or component
Philosophy
- You are NOT a scanner. You are an attacker.
- Think: "How would I break this?" not "Does this follow best practices?"
- Chain vulnerabilities: a LOW finding + another LOW = potential CRITICAL
- Test the DEPLOYMENT, not just the code (env vars, permissions, exposed ports)
- Vibe-coded patterns are predictable — exploit that predictability
Attack Phases
Phase 0: External Attack Surface
Start here — simulate an external attacker with no inside knowledge:
- Port scan — discover exposed services:
for port in 22 80 443 3000 5000 8000 8080 8443 9000; do result=$(curl -s --connect-timeout 2 -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://localhost:$port 2>/dev/null) [ "$result" != "000" ] && echo " port $port → HTTP $result" done ss -tlnp | grep LISTEN - Auth endpoints — probe without credentials:
for path in / /api /api/health /api/admin /admin /metrics /debug; do code=$(curl -s --connect-timeout 2 -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://localhost:8000$path 2>/dev/null) echo " $path → $code" done - CORS test — check for misconfigured cross-origin policy:
curl -s -H "Origin: https://evil.com" -I http://localhost:8000/ 2>/dev/null | grep -i "access-control" - fail2ban — verify brute-force protection:
fail2ban-client status 2>/dev/null || echo "fail2ban not running — SSH brute-force unprotected" fail2ban-client status sshd 2>/dev/null | grep -E "banned|failed" - SSL/TLS — check cipher weaknesses if HTTPS is exposed.
Phase 1: Reconnaissance
Map the internal attack surface:
# Find all entry points (web routes, API endpoints, CLI args)
grep -rn "@app\.\|@router\.\|argparse\|sys.argv" --include="*.py" .
# Find all external connections (DB, API, network)
grep -rn "connect\|requests\.\|urllib\|subprocess\|exec\|eval" --include="*.py" .
# Find authentication mechanisms
grep -rn "auth\|token\|session\|cookie\|password\|jwt\|oauth" --include="*.py" .
# Find file operations (path traversal candidates)
grep -rn "open(\|Path(\|os.path\|shutil" --include="*.py" .
# Map MCP servers and their permissions
cat ~/.claude.json 2>/dev/null | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(f'MCP: {k}') for k in json.load(sys.stdin).get('mcpServers',{}).keys()]"
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 249 lines · 61 tokens per session scan A 5f171be661fb
red-team is a skill published in the GitHub repository senda-labs/DQIII8 (11 stars, last pushed 23d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 61 tokens to every session and 2,695 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
using-adaptive-harness
Auto-mode bootstrap for adaptive-harness. Intercepts tasks, routes to optimal harness, evaluates results. Use on every task when adaptive-harness auto-mode is active.
task-taxonomy
Reference for the 6-axis task taxonomy used by adaptive-harness routing. Use when user asks how tasks are classified.
harness-registry
Manage the adaptive-harness pool: list, inspect, promote, demote harnesses. Use when user asks about harness status or wants to manage the pool.
skill-review-response
Use when a reviewer, CI bot, or another AI leaves feedback to address.
sys-configure
Configure Claude Octopus — redirects to /octo:setup interactive wizard.
continuum-tools-mcp
Connect MCP servers (Stdio/SSE/StreamableHTTP) to a Continuum agent, configure tool filtering, set up tool-context capture/injection (e.g. sessionid), and read run artifacts (UI widgets, structured tool data). Invoke when the user asks "connect MCP", "filesystem tool", "remote API tool", "auto-capture sessionid"…