learn-claude-code is an educational project that builds a small Claude Code-like agent harness from scratch, showing how model access is combined with the surrounding code that lets an agent perceive, reason, and act in an environment. It is for people learning to develop real AI agents. The catalogue add-ons support workflows built around this agent harness.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add shareAI-lab/learn-claude-code --skill mcp-buildergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/shareAI-lab/learn-claude-codeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/shareai-lab/learn-claude-code/mcp-builder)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shareai-lab/learn-claude-code/mcp-builder"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shareai-lab/learn-claude-code/mcp-builder/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shareai-lab/learn-claude-code/mcp-builder"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shareai-lab/learn-claude-code/mcp-builder.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- Snyk pass
- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 5 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Agent Snooping · line 75 Skill accesses MCP server configuration files (mcp.json). MCP configs contain server URLs, authentication tokens, and tool definitions — reading them allows the skill to discover and potentially abuse other tool integrations.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that read MCP configuration files (mcp.json). MCP server details should be managed by the agent runtime, not read by individual skills.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 3 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 154 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 200 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- low MCP Rug Pull · line 27 pip install without ==version installs the latest release, which could include malicious changes.Fix: Pin the version: pip install package==1.2.3
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00038 | $0.01225 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00490 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00245 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00122 |
Grade A, and why
mcp-builder scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
8 near-identical copies found in the catalogue:
- mcp-builder — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
- mcp-builder — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
- mcp-builder — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
- mcp-builder — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
- mcp-builder — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
- mcp-builder — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
- mcp-builder — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
- mcp-builder — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 214 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
MCP Server Building Skill
You now have expertise in building MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers. MCP enables Claude to interact with external services through a standardized protocol.
What is MCP?
MCP servers expose:
- Tools: Functions Claude can call (like API endpoints)
- Resources: Data Claude can read (like files or database records)
- Prompts: Pre-built prompt templates
Quick Start: Python MCP Server
1. Project Setup
# Create project
mkdir my-mcp-server && cd my-mcp-server
python3 -m venv venv && source venv/bin/activate
# Install MCP SDK
pip install mcp
2. Basic Server Template
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""my_server.py - A simple MCP server"""
from mcp.server import Server
from mcp.server.stdio import stdio_server
from mcp.types import Tool, TextContent
# Create server instance
server = Server("my-server")
# Define a tool
@server.tool()
async def hello(name: str) -> str:
"""Say hello to someone.
Args:
name: The name to greet
"""
return f"Hello, {name}!"
@server.tool()
async def add_numbers(a: int, b: int) -> str:
"""Add two numbers together.
Args:
a: First number
b: Second number
"""
return str(a + b)
# Run server
async def main():
async with stdio_server() as (read, write):
await server.run(read, write)
if __name__ == "__main__":
import asyncio
asyncio.run(main())
3. Register with Claude
Add to ~/.claude/mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"my-server": {
"command": "python3",
"args": ["/path/to/my_server.py"]
}
}
}
TypeScript MCP Server
1. Setup
mkdir my-mcp-server && cd my-mcp-server
npm init -y
npm install @modelcontextprotocol/sdk
2. Template
// src/index.ts
import { Server } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js";
import { StdioServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js";
const server = new Server({
name: "my-server",
version: "1.0.0",
});
// Define tools
server.setRequestHandler("tools/list", async () => ({
tools: [
{
name: "hello",
description: "Say hello to someone",
inputSchema: {
type: "object",
properties: {
name: { type: "string", description: "Name to greet" },
},
required: ["name"],
},
},
],
}));
server.setRequestHandler("tools/call", async (request) => {
if (request.params.name === "hello") {
const name = request.params.arguments.name;
return { content: [{ type: "text", text: `Hello, ${name}!` }] };
}
throw new Error("Unknown tool");
});
// Start server
const transport = new StdioServerTransport();
server.connect(transport);
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 214 lines · 38 tokens per session scan A 1f0d78f42028
mcp-builder is a skill published in the GitHub repository shareAI-lab/learn-claude-code (78,787 stars, last pushed 21d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 38 tokens to every session and 1,225 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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