Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge --skill codebasegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ShulkwiSEC/bb-hugeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/codebase)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/codebase"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/codebase/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/codebase"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/codebase.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00208 | $0.08071 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00104 | $0.04036 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00042 | $0.01614 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00021 | $0.00807 |
Grade A, and why
codebase scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Unrestricted tool accesslowExcessive agency
A wildcard tool grant or "run any command" leaves no least-privilege boundary at all.
- **Over-permissioned operations**: can the tool delete data, modify configs, access other users' resources, execute arbitrary code? Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
- `eval()`, `exec()`, `subprocess`, `os.system()`, `child_process.exec()` — code execution How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 581 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
White-Box Codebase Security Review
You are an expert application security engineer performing a white-box source code review. Your goal: read and understand the application's source code to identify vulnerabilities, map the attack surface, and produce a security knowledge base that informs all downstream penetration testing and threat modeling.
This review is structured around the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) 5.0 — 427 verification requirements across 16 chapters. You don't need to verify all 427 — focus on what's verifiable from source code and prioritize by risk.
Request: $ARGUMENTS
CHAIN COMMITMENTS — DECLARE BEFORE STARTING
Read this before executing any workflow phase. Commit to MANDATORY chains before your first tool call.
| Trigger | Chain | Mandatory? | Claude Code | opencode |
|---|---|---|---|---|
After session(action="complete") |
/threat-modeling |
MANDATORY | Skill(skill="threat-modeling") |
cat ~/.config/opencode/commands/threat-modeling.md |
After /threat-modeling completes |
/remediate |
MANDATORY | Skill(skill="remediate") |
cat ~/.config/opencode/commands/remediate.md |
After session(action="complete") |
/gh-export |
OPTIONAL — user request only | Skill(skill="gh-export") |
cat ~/.config/opencode/commands/gh-export.md |
| Live target available (any endpoints discovered in code) | /web-exploit |
MANDATORY | Skill(skill="web-exploit") |
cat ~/.config/opencode/commands/web-exploit.md |
| LLM/AI integration detected in code | /ai-redteam |
MANDATORY | Skill(skill="ai-redteam") |
cat ~/.config/opencode/commands/ai-redteam.md |
| API routes/controllers found | /api-security |
OPTIONAL | Skill(skill="api-security") |
cat ~/.config/opencode/commands/api-security.md |
| CVE-affected dependency found | /analyze-cve |
OPTIONAL | Skill(skill="analyze-cve") |
cat ~/.config/opencode/commands/analyze-cve.md |
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 581 lines · 208 tokens per session scan A 2a1e5e8676bb
codebase is a skill published in the GitHub repository ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 208 tokens to every session and 8,071 once invoked, about $0.0010 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (unrestricted tool access, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
bugcrowd-reporting
Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints…
skill-context-detection
Auto-detect work context (Dev vs Knowledge) — use to tailor workflows based on current task type.
skill-copilot-provider
GitHub Copilot CLI as optional zero-cost provider via copilot -p programmatic mode.
supabase
Supabase / PostgREST Row-Level-Security playbook — pull the anon (or leaked servicerole) key out of the frontend JS, map tables from the auto-generated OpenAPI spec, test anonymous RLS READ disclosures (PII/secret leaks), and anonymous RLS WRITE abuse (insert/update/delete — e.g. forging…
skill-security-framing
URL validation and content sanitization for untrusted sources — use when handling external input safely.
race
Race condition / TOCTOU playbook — limit overrun (one-time codes used twice, gift cards spent twice), single-packet attack (last-byte sync) to force parallel processing, and state-confusion races (file upload + read, order before payment). Use when timing-sensitive logic could be abused — one-time codes, coupons/gift…