Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge --skill default-credentialsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ShulkwiSEC/bb-hugeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/default-credentials)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/default-credentials"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/default-credentials/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/default-credentials"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/default-credentials.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00099 | $0.01539 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00049 | $0.00770 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00020 | $0.00308 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00154 |
Grade A, and why
default-credentials scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -X POST https://TARGET/wp-login.php \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 141 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Default and Weak Credentials
What Is Broken and Why
Web applications, CMS platforms, and network devices ship with documented default credentials that administrators frequently fail to change. Weak password policies that permit short, common, or non-complex passwords compound the risk by allowing brute-force and credential-stuffing attacks to succeed rapidly. When combined with exposed admin paths discovered through fingerprinting, the attack chain from reconnaissance to authenticated access can be trivially short.
Key Signals
- Admin path accessible:
/wp-admin/,/administrator/,/admin/,/manager/,/console/ - Framework identified via cookie names, headers, or meta tags (WordPress, Joomla, Drupal, etc.)
- Login form accepts
admin/admin,admin/password,admin/<blank>,root/root - Password policy accepts "Password1" or "123456" on registration/change
- No account lockout after repeated failed attempts
- No rate limiting or CAPTCHA on login endpoint
- Error messages distinguish between invalid username and invalid password (username enumeration)
- HTTP Basic Auth realm on admin endpoints
Methodology
- Fingerprint the platform: Identify CMS/framework via headers, cookies, HTML markers,
and path probing (see
web-fingerprintingskill). - Locate login endpoint: Check
/robots.txtDisallow entries; dirbust with framework-specific wordlist; follow redirects from root path. - Check for lockout and rate limiting: Submit 5-10 intentionally wrong credentials; observe whether account locks or responses slow.
- Username enumeration: Test error message differentiation between unknown user and wrong password.
- Default credential test: Try documented defaults for identified platform.
- Weak password spray: Test a short list of common passwords against discovered usernames (low-and-slow to avoid lockout).
- Password policy audit: Attempt to register or change password to weak values; document what is and is not accepted.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 141 lines · 99 tokens per session scan A 4793a39158cc
default-credentials is a skill published in the GitHub repository ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 99 tokens to every session and 1,539 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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