Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge --skill gh-exportgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ShulkwiSEC/bb-hugeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/gh-export)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/gh-export"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/gh-export/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/gh-export"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/gh-export.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00031 | $0.00998 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00499 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00200 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00100 |
Grade A, and why
gh-export scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
<paste the raw curl command, HTTP request from pocs/*.http, or tool output excerpt that proves exploitability> How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 84 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
GitHub Issue Export
Purpose
Read findings.json from the current pentest session and produce one copy-pasteable GitHub issue markdown block per confirmed finding.
Each block follows the AppSec reporting guide format — concrete impact, reproducible steps, raw PoC — so developers can act immediately without back-and-forth.
Workflow
- Read
findings.jsonfrom the repo root (or the path provided in$ARGUMENTSif given) - For each entry in
findings[].findings(skip diagram entries):- Format it using the template below
- Check
pocs/for any.httpfile whose name contains a keyword from the finding title — if found, read it and paste the content into the PoC block - After formatting the block, call
http(action="request", ...)with methodPATCH, urlhttp://localhost:7777/api/findings/{finding.id}, body{"gh_issue": "<the formatted markdown block>"}, and headers{"Content-Type": "application/json"}— this couples the block to the finding in the dashboard
- Write all formatted blocks to
gh-issues.mdin the repo root, separated by---, with a header line# GitHub Issues — <target> — <date>at the top. Create or overwrite the file. - Print all blocks consecutively with a
---separator between them - After the last block, print a one-line summary:
X issue(s) ready to file — saved to gh-issues.md and copied above.
Output Template
For every finding, output exactly this structure (omit ## Browsers Verified In for non-browser/non-web findings):
**Summary:** <one sentence: what the vulnerability is and which component/endpoint is affected>
**Impact:** <what an attacker can concretely do — name the data exposed, the privilege gained, or the service disrupted. Never write "could lead to" — write "allows an attacker to". One short paragraph.>
**Severity Level:** <Critical | High | Medium | Low>
## Steps To Reproduce:
1. <exact first step — full URL, parameter name, payload>
2. <exact second step>
3. <what to observe in the response that confirms the issue>
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 84 lines · 31 tokens per session scan A 567eaca391cb
gh-export is a skill published in the GitHub repository ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 31 tokens to every session and 998 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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