Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge --skill lattice-crypto-attacksgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ShulkwiSEC/bb-hugeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/lattice-crypto-attacks)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/lattice-crypto-attacks"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/lattice-crypto-attacks/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/lattice-crypto-attacks"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/lattice-crypto-attacks.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00055 | $0.04464 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00028 | $0.02232 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00893 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00446 |
Grade A, and why
lattice-crypto-attacks scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
100% identical to lattice-crypto-attacks — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 498 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
SKILL: Lattice-Based Cryptanalysis — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert lattice techniques for CTF and cryptanalysis. Covers LLL/BKZ reduction, Coppersmith's method (univariate and multivariate), Hidden Number Problem for DSA/ECDSA nonce recovery, knapsack attacks, and NTRU analysis. Base models often fail to construct the correct attack lattice (wrong dimensions, missing scaling factors) or misapply Coppersmith bounds.
0. RELATED ROUTING
- rsa-attack-techniques for RSA-specific attacks that use lattice methods (Coppersmith, Boneh-Durfee)
- symmetric-cipher-attacks for LCG state recovery via lattice
- classical-cipher-analysis when lattice methods apply to classical cipher analysis
Quick application guide
| Problem Type | Lattice Technique | Key Parameter |
|---|---|---|
| RSA small roots | Coppersmith (LLL on polynomial lattice) | Root bound X < N^(1/e) |
| RSA small d | Boneh-Durfee (multivariate Coppersmith) | d < N^0.292 |
| DSA/ECDSA nonce bias | Hidden Number Problem → CVP | Bias bits known |
| Knapsack cipher | Low-density lattice attack | Density < 0.9408 |
| LCG truncated output | CVP on recurrence lattice | Unknown bits per output |
| Subset sum | LLL reduction on knapsack lattice | Element size vs count |
| NTRU key recovery | Lattice reduction on NTRU lattice | Dimension and key size |
1. LATTICE FUNDAMENTALS
1.1 Definitions
A lattice L is the set of all integer linear combinations of basis vectors:
L = { a₁·b₁ + a₂·b₂ + ... + aₙ·bₙ | aᵢ ∈ ℤ }
where b₁, ..., bₙ are linearly independent vectors in ℝᵐ.
Key problems:
- SVP (Shortest Vector Problem): Find the shortest non-zero vector in L
- CVP (Closest Vector Problem): Given target t, find v ∈ L closest to t
- SVP is NP-hard in general, but LLL finds an approximately short vector in polynomial time
1.2 Lattice Quality Metrics
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 498 lines · 55 tokens per session scan A 5d548bccb6d8
lattice-crypto-attacks is a skill published in the GitHub repository ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge (22 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 55 tokens to every session and 4,464 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to lattice-crypto-attacks, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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