Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add signalridge/slipway --skill proposegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/signalridge/slipwayWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/signalridge/slipway/propose)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/signalridge/slipway/propose"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/signalridge/slipway/propose/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/signalridge/slipway/propose"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/signalridge/slipway/propose.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Prompt Injection · line 17 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 39 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 56 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00022 | $0.01755 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00877 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00351 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00176 |
Grade A, and why
slipway-propose scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 77 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Slipway Propose
Use this capability only when the user explicitly asks to propose or publish a Slipway Issue. It may use the current conversation directly; it does not require a prior Clarify session and must not start implementation.
Choose the coherent level without fragmenting implementation steps:
- one observable result that is independently deliverable, verifiable, and reversible, leaves a meaningful safe repository state, and roughly fits one fresh Agent context becomes a Change; when several layers are involved, keep it as a vertical slice;
- split two results only when each can be delivered independently; keep non-deliverable implementation steps as a checklist;
- a result that necessarily needs multiple independent deliveries becomes an Objective for later explicit decomposition.
A managed Change starts with the exact first non-empty line <!-- slipway-level: change/v2 -->, has a [Change] title, exactly one level:change label, exactly one of kind:feature|kind:bug|kind:refactor|kind:maintenance|kind:research|kind:docs, and one strict Issue-body manifest. Publish Outcome, Requirements, Acceptance examples, Constraints, and Non-goals as independently addressable chapter comments; each starts with its exact <!-- slipway-section:v1 key=KEY --> marker. The manifest's ordered entries bind each key/role/title to the comment node ID, database ID hint, and exact body digest. It must be self-contained; unreferenced discussion and a parent Objective are not runtime inheritance. ready-for-agent is optional navigation only.
A managed Objective starts with the exact first non-empty line <!-- slipway-level: objective/v1 -->, immediately followed by <!-- slipway-publication-operation: UUID --> and <!-- slipway-publication-item: UUID -->. It has an [Objective] title, exactly one level:objective label, exactly one of kind:feature|kind:bug|kind:refactor|kind:maintenance|kind:research|kind:docs, and the H2 sections Problem, Outcome, Requirements, Shared constraints, Non-goals, and Changes. It is never an executable Run source and does not receive ready-for-agent. The body marker remains authority: title or level-label drift is a warning and may be repaired only after confirmation; it never blocks a marker-valid Change Run.
For an existing Issue without a valid marker, do not rewrite it silently. Present exactly three choices: the user manually applies a normalized body; create a separately confirmed managed Change linked to it; or use a bounded summary in an explicit ad-hoc Run.
{{ template "source-bundle" . }}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 77 lines · 22 tokens per session scan A 18c8d2124478
slipway-propose is a skill published in the GitHub repository signalridge/slipway (23 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed BSD-3-Clause. It adds 22 tokens to every session and 1,755 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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autoprompt
Explicit-only useful-first orchestration. Invoke only when the user names autoprompt - typed as /autoprompt or in plain language such as "act in autoprompt mode" - to turn a mission into one executable roadmap, build dependency-safe lanes, and verify the result with independent reviewers. Do not infer invocation from…
autoprompt
Explicit-only useful-first orchestration. Invoke /autoprompt to turn a mission into one executable roadmap, build dependency-safe lanes, and verify the result with independent reviewers. Never infer invocation from ordinary requests. Never resume from leftover artifacts without an explicit resume instruction.
autoprompt
Explicit-only useful-first orchestration. Invoke /autoprompt to turn a mission into one executable roadmap, build dependency-safe lanes, and verify the result with independent reviewers. Never infer invocation from ordinary requests. Never resume from leftover artifacts without an explicit resume instruction.
autoprompt
Explicit-only useful-first orchestration. Invoke /autoprompt to turn a mission into one executable roadmap, build dependency-safe lanes, and verify the result with independent reviewers. Never infer invocation from ordinary requests. Never resume from leftover artifacts without an explicit resume instruction.