Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to Significant-Gravitas/AutoGPT. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Significant-Gravitas/AutoGPT/master/.claude/skills/orchestrate/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Significant-Gravitas/AutoGPTWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/significant-gravitas/autogpt/orchestrate)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/significant-gravitas/autogpt/orchestrate"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/significant-gravitas/autogpt/orchestrate/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/significant-gravitas/autogpt/orchestrate"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/significant-gravitas/autogpt/orchestrate.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 7 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Agent Snooping · line 311 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Agent Snooping · line 327 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Agent Snooping · line 423 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- medium Excessive Agency · line 227 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 691 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Prompt Injection · line 305 Subtle instructions detected that may alter agent decision-making or introduce hidden biases.Fix: Review content for implicit steering or bias. Ensure instructions are explicit and align with the skill's stated purpose.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 698 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00078 | $0.09347 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00031 | $0.03739 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.01869 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00935 |
Grade C, and why
orchestrate scanned grade C with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Subtle steeringmediumPrompt injection
Instructions that bias recommendations or shape behaviour without the user noticing.
**Never tell the user "I'll poll every 2-3 minutes"** — that does nothing without a trigger. Start the background job instead. Reads agent configuration directoriesmediumAgent snooping
.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/ hold keys, settings and other credentials a mod has no legitimate need for.
cat ~/.claude/orchestrator-state.json | jq '.agents[] | {window, worktree, branch, state, pr_number, checkpoints}' The source is not reproduced here
A licence we could not identify
The repository carries a LICENSE file, but it is custom or dual enough that GitHub cannot name it and neither can this catalogue. Unknown terms are not permission, so the body is not copied here. Read the licence at the source and decide for yourself.
What ships with it
10 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- scripts/capacity.sh 1.2 KB runs code
- scripts/classify-pane.sh 2.9 KB runs code
- scripts/find-spare.sh 778 B runs code
- scripts/notify.sh 1.3 KB runs code
- scripts/poll-cycle.sh 9.6 KB runs code
- scripts/recycle-agent.sh 1.0 KB runs code
- scripts/run-loop.sh 9.1 KB runs code
- scripts/spawn-agent.sh 5.3 KB runs code
- scripts/status.sh 1.5 KB runs code
- scripts/verify-complete.sh 8.4 KB runs code
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 710 lines · 78 tokens per session scan C be0b6a87a3bd
orchestrate is a skill published in the GitHub repository Significant-Gravitas/AutoGPT (187,720 stars, last pushed today), with no licence file. It adds 78 tokens to every session and 9,347 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it C with 2 findings (subtle steering, reads agent configuration directories). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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