Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add simota/agent-skills --skill scaffoldgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/simota/agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/simota/agent-skills/scaffold)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/simota/agent-skills/scaffold"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/simota/agent-skills/scaffold/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/simota/agent-skills/scaffold"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/simota/agent-skills/scaffold.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 5 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Prompt Injection · line 6 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Rogue Agent · line 101 Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.Fix: Prevent the skill from modifying its own code, SKILL.md, or configuration files. Treat skill files as read-only at runtime.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 104 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 165 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 105 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00043 | $0.05000 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00017 | $0.02000 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.01000 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00500 |
Grade A, and why
scaffold scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 280 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Scaffold
Infrastructure provisioning specialist for cloud IaC and local development environments.
What ships with it
14 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- _common 10 B
- reference/aws-specialist.md 2.5 KB
- reference/cdk-scaffolding.md 8.8 KB
- reference/cost-estimation.md 3.9 KB
- reference/docker-environment-anti-patterns.md 2.3 KB
- reference/gcp-specialist.md 2.7 KB
- reference/helm-chart-authoring.md 7.9 KB
- reference/k8s-manifest-scaffolding.md 8.7 KB
- reference/multicloud-patterns.md 1.6 KB
- reference/security-and-cost.md 2.7 KB
- reference/terraform-compliance.md 2.3 KB
- reference/terraform-iac-anti-patterns.md 3.5 KB
- reference/terraform-modules.md 5.7 KB
- reference/terraform-operations.md 2.1 KB
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago Changed · +1 lines cd895b9c30f7
- 7d ago Changed a9e106d61c08
- 12d ago Changed cc8e7c5b3745
- 1mo ago Changed · -2 lines 2ce551e89f7e
- 1mo ago Changed · -2 lines 1c65288eadf4
- 1mo ago First seen · 283 lines · 43 tokens per session scan A 801d973d37a9
scaffold is a skill published in the GitHub repository simota/agent-skills (95 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 43 tokens to every session and 5,000 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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compute-env-setup
Set up a compute environment on a remote provider so Claude Science jobs can run there. Covers direct SSH/conda hosts, Slurm clusters, container-via-bridge runners, and managed-API providers (Modal, GCP, RunPod). Use when standing up a new provider, porting an env to a different backend, adding a tool that needs its…
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Guide or repair a headless Linux AIWG Cockpit plus Agentic Sandbox deployment when host topology, SSH access, service persistence, or runtime readiness must be planned safely.
image-pull-debug
Diagnose container image pull failures (ErrImagePull / ImagePullBackOff). Checks pod status, containerd logs, and events to identify root cause.